On February 21st, Turkey’s first-ever domestically built fighter jet took to the skies for the primary time. It departed from Mürted Airfield Command, situated 22 miles north of the capital Ankara. On the controls was Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) test pilot Barbaros Demirbas.
For 13 minutes, the prototype jet cautiously flew (with its landing gear locked down) out to eight,000 feet high and no faster than 265 miles per hour, accompanied by a Turkish Air Force two-seat F-16D fighter.
Then, Kaan circled back around and executed a drag-chute assisted landing at Mürted (formerly Akinci Air Base, before it was renamed attributable to the participation of local F-16 squadrons in a failed 2016 military coup). Subsequent tests will involve progressively higher altitudes and speed to a peak of around twice the speed of sound.
Kaan plays a key role in Turkey’s plans to eventually develop a self-sufficient military, despite the high costs and technical complexity intrinsic to constructing modern warplanes.
The dual engine-jet, also referred to as the National Combat Aircraft (MMU) had its public roll out and initial tax-testing in March of 2023. That yr it underwent wind tunnel, radar cross-section, and ejection seat testing—the facilities for which reflected major recent investments by TAI. Nonetheless, its maiden flight took place two months later than intended.
Kaan has a profile broadly just like the U.S. F-22A Raptor stealth fighter. Sporting an aluminum nose and titanium center fuselage, its surfaces are coated with lightweight, low radar-reflective composite carbon thermoplastics that Turkish firms were originally constructing for F-35 jets.
As externally-mounted weapons degrade stealth, it has two small internal ‘cheek’ bays nested next to the engines capable of carry two short-range air-to-air missiles each. Nonetheless, configuration of the important under-fuselage bay with capability for as much as 4 longer-range air-to-air missiles or air-to-ground weapons reportedly took longer to finalize—though a circulating picture suggests that will have been resolved.
More problematically, the prototype’s American F110-GE-129 turbofan engines (also used on F-16 fighters) aren’t optimized for stealth.
The more a jet’s radar cross-section (RCS) has been reduced by its geometry and use of radar absorbent materials, the closer it will possibly safely approach enemy fighters and air defenses and slip past or attack them before they will react. And the extent to which RCS reductions apply to the fighter’s side and rear aspect (not only the front) dictates how deep it will possibly penetrate enemy airspace.
In respects to kinematics, Kaan is aimed to fall inside typical modern fighter performance benchmarks: a maximum speed of Mach 1.8 to 2.2, service ceiling of 55,000 ft., tolerance for maneuvers exerting as much as 9 Gs, and a spread of 700 miles on internal fuel. It’s also expected to be supercruise-capable, i.e. capable of fly sustainably at supersonic speeds without resorting to fuel-gulping afterburners. Use of two engines will raise costs but, should reduces losses to engine failures.
Kaan is to be armed with reconnaissance pods and standoff-range precision-guided weapons—including NATO-standard missiles like Meteor, and indigenous Turkish armaments just like the short-range Bozdogan and medium-range Gokdogan air-to-air missiles, SOM cruise missiles (171-mile range), and MAM-T anti-tank missiles.
Avionics will supposedly include a contemporary glass cockpit—with voice-command AI-autopilot that may land the plane should the pilot fall unconscious—and a British Martin-Baker ejection seat (possibly the US-16E model). TAI also guarantees fused sensors (including a jam-resistant and stealthy AESA gallium-nitride radar by Turkish firm ASELSAN), a nose-mounted infrared sensor and a 360-degree coverage electro-optical targeting system under the fuselage (fittings for each of that are already visible), open-architecture mission systems, a helmet-mounted sight, and the aptitude to regulate accompanying Anka-3 combat drones.
In fact, Kaan still has a protracted journey ahead of it. The present prototype lacks mission systems. The next two prototypes, planned to fly in 2025 and 2026, must have most in place. After producing between 7 and 10 prototypes in total, delivery of the primary ten Block 1- aircraft intended for military service is slated for 2030-2033. Only then is a decade of mass-production to begin (at a rate of 24 aircraft per yr) to progressively replace Turkey’s F-16 fleet and serve on through the 2070s.
Unless Turkey can secure export orders to expand total orders and reduce unit costs, each Kaan is prone to exceed $100 million per aircraft—greater than if Turkey had procured U.S. F-35 stealth jets with likely superior stealth features.
That just isn’t to say Kaan won’t potentially be higher tailored to suit certain Turkish requirements, including potentially higher performance for within-visual-range air-to-air combat, and integration into Turkey’s growing ecosystem of indigenous weapons, sensors, drones, and battle management networks.
Just as South Korea plans to upgrade its comparable KF-21 Boramae fighter, Turkey also hopes to eventually use Kaan as the idea for a more full-featured stealth jet with AI-driven capabilities. Azerbaijan and Ukraine (each established clients of Turkish combat drones), in addition to Pakistan, Indonesia, and the UAE are cited as potential future buyers.
But most significantly, as Turkish relations with the U.S. and Germany have frayed, Kaan now takes on the added importance of giving Turkey the choice to construct its own aircraft no matter its relations with Western countries.
Why jet fighters have big implications for Turkish foreign relations
Kaan—or quite, TF-X—began development in 2010 when Turkey was well along the solution to acquiring a big fleet of single-engine F-35 stealth jets. But worsening relations with the U.S. culminated in 2019 with Turkey’s rejection from the F-35 program, and denial of upgrades and recent orders for Turkey’s large fleet of F-16 fighters.
That, in turn, forced Kaan to evolve from an air-superiority-focused fighter right into a more squarely multi-role aircraft. Turkey’s comparatively mature drone industry has also seen future combat drones assume a task in teaming up with manned Kaan jet fighters—notably, the transonic jet fighter-like Kizilelma (“Red Apple”) and the more traditional Anka-3 combat drone, each jet-powered.
Kaan’s importance stems from Turkey’s shifting and sometimes conflictual relationships with its fellow NATO states, Russia, Ukraine, and other states within the Middle East and Asia.
For instance, Turkey, operates Type 214 diesel-electric submarines, F-16 and F-4 jet fighters, and Patton and Leopard 2A4 important battle tanks from the Germany and the U.S. But within the 2010s, these countries cut Turkey off from F-35s, Eurofighter jets, and German tank engines attributable to Turkey’s acquisition of Russian air defense missiles, human rights concerns, and conflicting Middle East agendas.
Turkey’s ejection from the F-35 program in 2019 sank Turkey’s hopes to deploy the F-35B jump jet model onto the under-construction carrier Anadolu (now a drone carrier), and opened a modernization gap for the Turkish Air Force within the 2020s by delaying retirement of Turkey’s upgraded (but aging) third-generation F-4E Terminator 2020 strike fighters.
Finally, in 2023, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan parlayed a tacit trade of the Turkish acceptance of Sweden joining NATO into U.S. sales of F-16s and F-16 upgrades that had long been refused. He also still hopes to secure a deal for 40 4.5-generation Eurofighter 2000 jets, which might require Germany to lift its block.
U.S. officials recently reiterated their willingness to sell Turkey F-35s should it retire its Russian-built S-400 air defenses. That’s arguably a good tradeoff—the S-400 has had some successes in over Ukrainian aerospace, but has been out-shined by the supposedly shorter-range U.S. Patriot system delivered to Ukraine. Nonetheless, Erdogan has reiterated his view that that is politically unacceptable.
The sting is worsened now that Turkey’s arch-rival Greece (also a member of the NATO alliance) was approved to amass F-35s by the U.S. and extra Rafale fighters from France (which opposes Turkish policies in Libya and the Mediterranean). Longstanding disputes over Mediterranean islands lead Greek and Turkish jets to ceaselessly confront one another, with each states perpetually planning for possible war.
More broadly, Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies—particularly for the reason that failed 2016 coup—have reduced enthusiasm in Western states. Nonetheless, Turkey’s control of the Bosporus strait connecting the Mediterranean to the Black Sea has long made it hard for NATO allies to completely alienate Erdogan, despite frequent conflicts of interest. And Turkey’s ability to disclaim passage to warships has turn out to be much more critical now that the Black Sea has turn out to be a contested warzone between Russia and Ukraine.
Helpfully for NATO, Erdogan’s late-2010s flirtations with Russia have been partially offset by growing defense-industrial partnerships with Ukraine in drones, artillery, and small warships. But relations remain tense in lots of places.
Turkey decisively backed Azerbaijan in its wars with Armenia—a nominally Russia-allied state increasingly turning to India and France as security partners. Turkish forces in Syria undermine the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad (backed by Russia and opposed by the U.S.) but additionally battle Kurdish factions (backed by the U.S.)—circumstances which result in the downing of a Turkish combat drone by a U.S. fighter in 2023.
Turkish defense partnerships with the UK and South Korea appear healthy, nonetheless.
Kaan’s production prospects
Turkey’s complex foreign relations make its desire for independent aircraft capability way more urgent than they may be if the country had more stable relationship with its allies.
Nonetheless, while Turkey insists Kaan will use 80-85% indigenous components, the important thing stumbling block stays dependency on U.S.-built F110 engines, that are assembled but not produced locally by Tusas Engine Industries (TEI). For now, it’s not guaranteed that the U.S. will grant Turkey’s request to license-build F110 engines for Kaan beyond the ten procured.
High-performance turbofans are infamously hard to perfect, with China—a rustic with considerable resources to throw at the issue—still working to completely ween itself from dependency on Russian engines.
To eventually replace the F110, Turkey is weighing competing proposals for a 35,000-lb thrust engine: one involving Turkish company Kale and the UK’s Rolls Royce, and the opposite involvng TEI and Ukrainian company Ivchenko Progress. Turkish officials have said that a 3rd engine option is scoped as well—perhaps referring to a non-NATO state like China, Russia, or Ukraine. Turkey can also be developing fully indigenous turbofan designs (TF6000 and TF10000), but these appear to fall in need of Kaan’s thrust requirements for now.
Besides that, Turkish industry does profit from relatively mature and combat-tested munitions, networks, drones, and sensors that it will possibly adapt for Kaan. Nonetheless, the U.S. aerospace sector’s notorious difficulties in finalizing development of the F-35 point to how the combination of systems often proves tougher than expected—particularly when trying to evolve to weight limits and stealth-aircraft-specific geometry and volume constraints.
Due to Turkey’s demonstrated vulnerability to being denied U.S. military exports, Kaan seems prone to complete development. The massive challenge stays securing engines and avoiding delays and value overruns (given Turkey’s ongoing inflation crisis and tumultuous foreign relations) in order that Kaan stays viable by the point it enters service.
For comparison, India’s program to develop an indigenous fighter resulted within the Tejas Mk1, which (by the point it accomplished development) fell in need of foreign alternatives, leading to only limited procurement. But India hopes that its investment in Tejas laid the groundwork for improved Tejas Mark 1A and Mark 2 jets—and, eventually, an AMCA stealth fighter—that would give it greater aerospace independence.
Turkey surely hopes that Kaan will debut higher up the aptitude spectrum than Tejas did, thereby justifying a bigger initial production run. Even when not as stealthy as an F-35A, a totally developed Kaan could eventually be used as the idea for a more advanced sixth-generation stealth aircraft and AI technology (something Turkey recently began researching), resulting in a sustainable and viable Turkish jet fighter production capability.
Admittedly, the precise role and longevity of manned jet fighters within the 21st century stays in flux, though Turkish industry already has a powerful start in constructing the cheaper combat drones emerging as a substitute.