WASHINGTON — Boeing’s effort to construct a brand new trainer aircraft for the Air Force is stricken by safety problems, schedule and testing delays, and the chance the T-7A Red Hawk could fall even further behind schedule, the Government Accountability Office said in a scathing report.
Boeing’s relationship with the Air Force has also been strained by the T-7′s issues, GAO said within the May 18 report, with service officials describing their ties as “tenuous.”
As this system proceeds and Boeing losses, which already exceed $1 billion, mount, GAO said, program officials expect more disagreements between the Air Force and the contractor. While the Air Force waits for the T-7 to be delivered, its own costs related to maintaining older jets could grow, the report warned.
Boeing said in a press release to Defense News it plans to maintain working with the service to repair the issues highlighted within the report, but didn’t address specific issues asked about by Defense News.
“Boeing and the U.S. Air Force are partnered on a path forward regarding these issues,” the corporate said. “Moreover, we proceed to guage findings and discovery during testing activities, which is standard practice when developing a brand new aircraft.”
Boeing in 2018 won an indefinite delivery contract, estimated to be value as much as $9.2 billion, to construct the Air Force’s recent jet trainer, set to interchange the greater than half-century-old T-38 Talon.
Student pilots will have the ability to make use of this advanced trainer to learn to fly jets akin to advanced fighters similar to the F-35, which has capabilities that didn’t exist when the T-38 was first built. Latest capabilities the T-7 will bring include fly-by-wire controls and high-altitude maneuverability. Moreover, this trainer will allow students to learn advanced air-to-air maneuvers and have the ability to accommodate pilots of various sizes, including men and ladies.
A shaky schedule
The T-7 has seen several schedule delays. Most recently, problems with a potentially dangerous escape system and ejection seat caused the Air Force to postpone to February 2025 a milestone C production decision on the T-7. The Air Force originally expected that call to are available late 2023.
This implies Boeing is now expected to start out delivering the T-7 in December 2025, and the Air Force is preparing for it to achieve initial operational capability in spring 2027 on the earliest. That may be nearly a decade after the Air Force originally hoped to have student pilots flying in its advanced trainer.
But program officials told GAO that even the brand new schedule Boeing specified by January 2023 is “likely optimistic” since it “is dependent upon favorable assumptions.”
Boeing’s revised T-7 schedule assumes this system could have a high success rate through the remaining of its development and testing, Air Force officials told GAO. This leaves “little to no margin” for error, including test failures, unexpected software revisions, a possible need to revamp the escape system, or other surprises, GAO said.
If something goes improper, the report added, the T-7 program could fall even further behind — perhaps significantly so, potentially jeopardizing even the revised production decision date and further pushing back production and delivery.
The Air Force is now planning to have the T-7′s development, testing and production phases considerably overlap, GAO said, which is able to add a fantastic deal more risk to the schedule.
This approach, often called concurrency, can result in rising costs or further schedule delays because if testing finds hidden problems, the contractor could should return into aircraft which have already been built to repair those issues.
Program officials told GAO they doubted overlapping development and testing would result in major changes to the T-7, and said concurrency had not driven up program costs.
But such problems have happened before, GAO said, citing a previous 2018 report that found it could cost a further $1.4 billion to repair problems in F-35 Joint Strike Fighters that had been built before testing was complete.
Boeing also plans to start out constructing the primary production T-7s before the Air Force officially places its order, GAO said, which could carry further risks. Boeing began constructing some parts for the T-7 in early 2022 by itself dime, GAO said, and plans to start out assembling the primary aircraft by early 2024, the report said.
GAO said this implies construction would start a couple of 12 months before the Air Force plans to position its first order for the aircraft, which is able to occur no before February 2025 after development and a fantastic deal of testing has been finished. And by the point the Air Force places its order, the report said, government officials imagine Boeing could have finished constructing seven to 10 T-7s it could present to the service.
GAO said Boeing told the Air Force in March 2022 it had already began constructing some parts that might go into the T-7 — although the Air Force warned Boeing two months earlier it was under no obligation to purchase trainer jets built with those parts until it placed an order. The Air Force also told Boeing any work it does has to fulfill all requirements for future orders.
Boeing told GAO it began initial construction on planes that might eventually be delivered to the Air Force since it faced pressure to maintain its suppliers busy and manufacturing costs down, particularly with schedule delays and financial losses mounting.
But this presents “significant risks” to the Air Force, GAO said. Because no contract is in place for constructing those aircraft, GAO said, the Air Force and the Defense Contract Management Agency can’t conduct all of the production oversight needed to make certain the planes will meet contract requirements. Even conducting oversight, DCMA warned the Air Force, could have the unintended effect of committing the Air Force to simply accept a few of Boeing’s work on the T-7, even with no contract, the report said.
The T-7 could also change significantly between the test phase and the award of a low-rate production contract, which might then should be retrofitted on already-built planes, GAO said. DCMA has already spotted greater than 8,000 differences between the five test T-7s Boeing has already built, and the Air Force’s own contract specifications, the report added.
Older trainers, rising costs
While these delays likely won’t drive up the T-7′s price for the Air Force, GAO said they could lead on to other rising costs. With the T-7 still years away from becoming operational, the service might want to keep training student pilots in its existing fleet of 504 T-38s and — to handle the more advanced features of pilot training — the F-22, which costs greater than eight times as much to fly per hour than the T-38 and T-7. In all, GAO estimated trainer delays could cost the Air Force almost $1 billion.
The Air Force can also be liable to higher costs if it will probably’t order all 351 T-7s it plans to purchase before the ordering period expires, GAO said. The Air Force now expects Boeing to start out constructing the primary 4 production T-7s in 2025 and steadily ramp up production until Boeing builds 48 Red Hawks annually between 2030 and 2033. The ultimate 18 T-7s are expected to be inbuilt 2034.
In a problem that echoes a lingering headache with the F-35 program, the Air Force told GAO it doesn’t have all the information from Boeing that it needs to take care of the T-7.
By January 2023, Boeing had provided the Air Force one-third of the list of parts and quantities used to construct and maintain the T-7, often called a bill of materials. That’s greater than three years later than the contract specified, GAO said, and a few of the information the Air Force must conduct its own maintenance was redacted.
Boeing told GAO some suppliers weren’t under contract at first and said its periodically updating this system office.
The Air Force desires to do as much “organic,” or in-house, maintenance on the T-7 as possible. But without that data, GAO said, it could be forced to rely on Boeing for maintenance and repairs.
The Air Force also needs the list of parts so it will probably manage its supply chain, and find replacements for parts as they change into obsolete, GAO said. Without that bill of materials, the Air Force told GAO it won’t know what equipment it would need to take care of the test aircraft the service plans to start flight-testing at Edwards Air Force Base in California this September.
Ejection seat delaying tests
Problems with the T-7′s escape system have already delayed the plane’s testing, GAO said, and the system will likely need several more revisions to its design and test before it’s protected enough to make use of.
The Air Force only allowed men to fly when older planes similar to the T-38 were originally built, so their cockpits weren’t designed to accommodate some women or individuals with smaller frames. The T-7 is meant to be protected and comfy for pilots with a big selection of body shapes and sizes.
But GAO said tests of the T-7′s escape system show considerable risks for a lot of pilots — even larger people — including potential concussions, spinal injuries, or eye and neck injuries. Tests conducted with the biggest manikins barely pass the Air Force’s safety standards, the report said, and smaller and average-sized manikins were at greater risk.
After 2021 tests raised alarm bells in regards to the T-7′s escape system, Boeing worked to enhance it. The Air Force said minor adjustments to the seat improved safety and reduced the chance to pilots.
A subsequent sled test in February 2023 showed enough progress that the service plans to proceed with a limited military flight release, allowing its pilots to start test-flying the T-7 while the ultimate problems with the escape system are fixed. In a sled test designed to simulate an ejection sequence, the Air Force accelerates a rail-mounted cockpit with a manikin inside to speeds much like a T-7 in flight before launching the manikin.
But even that testing plan means the Air Force is probably going almost two years away from showing the escape system meets all the protection requirements.
The Air Force and Boeing also disagree over how close the T-7′s flight control software is to being finished, GAO said. Boeing expects the software will likely be done by the center of this 12 months, the report said, however the Air Force’s own software experts said 5 – 6 more revisions to the software will likely be needed to repair problems with the trainer’s flight control, particularly because the T-7 takes on tougher flights similar to conducting maneuvers when climbing or diving at high angles of attack.
Each iteration could take six more months, Air Force experts told GAO, which could delay the completion of the software by greater than two years and — if the changes are significant — could disrupt flight testing.
In an indication of the tensions over this system, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Monday said the concept of digital engineering — which Boeing has touted as a revolutionary advancement in how recent aircraft might be built — has in some ways been “overhyped.”
Engineers have been using digital tools to design aircraft for many years, Kendall said at a breakfast roundtable with reporters hosted by the Defense Writers Group, after being asked in regards to the T-7′s delays and the fanfare that accompanied its digital design. Modern computing and data storage advancements have given engineers the power to process vast amounts of knowledge and swiftly communicate with each other, he said, allowing digital design processes to be fully integrated, he said.
This has led to notable cost and schedule savings, Kendall said. But digital advancements won’t replace real-world testing, he said — particularly when engineers try to “push the envelope” on entirely recent designs and don’t have models upon which they’ll fully rely.
“It’s a major improvement, nevertheless it has been overhyped,” Kendall said. “More integrated digital designs, higher modeling all help, but they’re not revolutionary. They’re a major improvement, [but] they don’t replace testing entirely. If you’re doing something that’s going to be radically different than prior programs, you’ve got to get it into testing.”
Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.