A video that made its solution to Russian social media last month reveals that a second Ukrainian warplane has been struck by a Russian kamikaze drone while at an airbase. And in contrast to the primary recording released, this strike clearly destroyed its goal—an Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack jet of Ukraine’s 299th Tactical Aviation Brigade.
The recording shows footage from the forward-looking camera of what appears to be a Lancet-3 kamikaze drone diving towards the Ukrainian jet, which was parked at Dolgintsevo airbase near Kryvhi Rhi. There’s also footage from a second drone observing the strike—likely an Orlan-10, or similar surveillance aircraft.
The Lancet plummets squarely into the Frogfoot jet and explodes, causing a hearth that eventually consumes the jet.
Prior footage released on September 19 shows one other Lancet strike on the identical airbase, which smashed into the bottom just next to the cockpit of a MiG-29 tactical fighter and caused significant damage—at minimum.
It’s likely (but isn’t confirmed) that the more recently released footage also dates back to September, resulting from the similar-looking condition of the airfield.
Indeed, on September 11, Russian stated media claimed that its Aerospace Force had destroyed two Ukrainian MiG-29s and three Su-25s at this airbase. While Russia’s claims are often dubiously over-inflated, this particular claim could confer with that incident.
If—contrary to the above assumption—the brand new footage comes from a separate strike in October, that may represent a more serious failure of Ukraine’s air force to adapt to the initial attack.
Some have also argued that the destroyed Su-25 is likely to be an elaborate decoy, but nothing within the footage supports that interpretation.
Lancet and Orlan: Drone Tag Team
Russia’s Lancet-3 kamikazes and Orlan-10 surveillance drones normally fight as a team on the frontline. The longer-endurance Orlan-10s help locate targets for the short-range Lancets to attack, after which hang around to watch the attack and assess damaged to the goal. Olran-10s may additionally function relays to increase the remote-control range of Lancet drones.
But this strike was anything but typical—even the big Project 51 Lancet-3s are believed to have a strike range of just 25 miles, and Dolgintsevo is situated 45-50 miles away from Russian-controlled territory on the opposite side of the Dnipro River.
Perhaps a specially modified Project 51 Lancet or the newest Project 53 Lancet was used.
The Russian state media reporter posting the video claims that a variety of 75 miles has been achieved by recent Lancets. Other sources, nevertheless, claim the rise is to 44 miles, which is likely to be just barely adequate to succeed in the bottom.
Alternately, reducing the burden of the Project 51’s 6.6-pound warhead could have increased range—though that may come at the price of requiring greater precision resulting from the smaller blast.
Could Russia have used another drone? Actually, Russia’s Iranian-supplied Shahed kamikaze drones could easily reach Dolgintsevo, but they are often pre-targeted to fixed satellite-navigation coordinates and aren’t precise enough to select off individual aircraft. The drone’s X-shaped shadow seen within the attack may additionally suggest the usage of some recent long-range quadcopter drone, however the Lancet-3 also has an X-shaped profile.
It’s undoubtedly bad news for Ukraine’s air force and other operational-depth support units (artillery, air defense, HQs, logistics), which now could also be liable to Russian precision strikes as much as 50 miles (or worse, 75 miles) depth from the frontline. That said, it’s not clear whether Russia can yet sustain such longer-range Lancet strikes, or if the attacks were undertaken by still limited-volume Project 53 prototypes or field modifications.
Ukraine’s Frogfoot Fleet
The destroyed Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot (also often known as the Grach ie. “Rook”) is an armored Soviet-built ground-attack jet with a big 30-millimeter gatling cannon intended to support frontline ground troops. Though similar conceptually to the U.S. Air Force’s A-10 Thunderbolt jet, the Frogfoot is lighter and faster. It also normally relies on unguided bombs and rockets, relatively than the A-10’s Hellfire guided anti-tank missiles.
The 299th Tactical Brigade counted 19 single-seat Su-25s and five two-seat Su-25UBM combat-capable trainers pre-war, with one other 15 or so Su-25s in storage. All but certainly one of these Frogfoots had been modernized to the M1 life-extended standard (recent satellite navigation, digital targeting systems, and modernized radios and flight recorders), and a number of were modernized to the further-improved M1K model—which added KUV 26-50-01 flare decoy dispenser to divert heat-seeking missiles.
Close air support is a dangerous mission, and since hostilities began, the 299th took losses equal to 2 thirds of its starting strength (16 aircraft) to Russian fighters and ground-based air defenses. Nevertheless, the unit has been capable of regenerate numbers because of 14 Su-25s donated by Bulgaria and 4 more from North Macedonia. It’s also likely that Ukraine has managed to revive a few of its Su-25s in storage to operational condition.
As of late, the 299th Brigade’s Su-25s are mostly used to offer rapid-response area bombardments on Russian positions and troop concentrations. They fly at extremely low altitude to mask themselves against radars, then abruptly nose upwards to launch their unguided rockets in an arc at several miles standoff from the goal (relatively than within the direct-fire mode they were designed for). This reduces their exposure to short-range air defenses.
Each the Su-25 and MiG-29 were designed to fly from rough frontline airstrips. This enables forward-deployed aircraft to quickly get to the combat zone while carrying more weapons, while also spending less time airborne and exposed to detection by Russian long-range radars—particularly on Russian Su-35S jets, MiG-31BM jets, and A-50 Mainstay airborne early warning planes.
But as they could now fall inside range of precision attacks by Lancet drones, Ukraine’s air force must balance these significant efficiencies against the heightened risk of losing aircraft on the bottom.
Kyiv’s Drone Defense Dilemma
The Lancet drone has proven to be Russia’s handiest weapon for targeting Ukraine’s deadly Western-supplied long-range artillery, as they will be remotely controlled for brief missions and attack relatively precisely (even when misses usually are not unusual). In the event that they can now fly far enough to hit bases for Ukrainian short-range fighters, that poses a grave problem.
Prior to the recent attacks, there was confirmation of just 4 Ukrainian jets destroyed on the bottom (2 MiG-29s, an Su-27 fighter and an Su-24 bomber) to Russian missile strikes within the war’s first 12 months and a half.
That is way more limited success than expected pre-war—attributable to the UAF’s rapid redeployment and dispersal of aircraft on the war’s onset, timely early warning of incoming attack (since then likely facilitated by NATO air surveillance assets), and Russia’s generally poor-quality real-time reconnaissance capabilities deeper into Ukrainian territory.
Thus, the 2 aircraft struck by Lancets are a sting Ukraine’s fleet of an estimated 100 or so still-operational combat jets.
To make sure, even the short-ranged MiG-29 and Su-25 easily have enough fuel to succeed in combat zones if deployed, say, 100 miles further back to avoid Lancet strikes. But doing so would require reduced combat payloads, invite greater risk of earlier detection by patrolling Russian fighters in transit to the combat zone, and increase the danger of crowding on the ‘medium-range’ bases (which, in turn, could make the craft more vulnerable to future Russian strikes).
Ukraine could, as an alternative, improve short-to-medium range air defenses around its frontline airbases to more reliably detect and destroy small drones. Unfortunately, such precious defense are very in-demand in all places in Ukraine—they’re used to defend each civilians and frontline troops—so there are unavoidable tradeoffs. Besides, defenses against such small targets have never been foolproof, because the targets will be tricky to detect.
Ukraine may also work on ensuring that parked aircraft are camouflaged or concealed in hangars, or deploy decoys to soak up additional Russian attacks. Even overhead “umbrellas” or nets could obscure a plane’s exact position and prematurely trigger the fuses of the shaped charges warheads used on many kamikaze drones.
Because it seems likely (though still uncertain) that the strike on the Su-25 also occurred in September, Ukraine may have already got undertaken countermeasures to avoid a repeat of this incident. The effectiveness of those countermeasures—and the extent to which enhanced range Lancets can be found—will determine whether these successful strikes prove to be one-off events, or proceed to exact a toll on the UAF’s operational fleet.