Following a D-Day memorial ceremony on June 6, French president Emmanuel Macron announced that France would furnish Ukraine with Mirage 2000-5 multi-role jet fighters by the tip of the yr, and train Ukrainian pilots the right way to operate them in France. Training of pilots and maintainers on French soil was on account of begin inside days, he said.
This can almost definitely involve a transfer of munitions—particularly, the MICA air-to-air missile—because the Mirage 2000-5 isn’t compatible with non-French weapons. It is especially incompatible with the common AIM-120 and Meteor medium-long-range air-to-air missiles.
It’s an overall big deal for Ukraine, given how expensive and complex jet fighters are. But some query whether the Mirages are sufficiently advantageous given the prices of bringing them into service.
Just like the F-16B/Cs that Ukraine is inducting into service, the Mirage 2000 is an agile fourth-generation jet fighter—cutting-edge when it debuted within the Nineteen Eighties, but lacking in long-range radar and weapons by contemporary standards.
The Mirage 2000-5F jets owned by France are second-generation (early-Nineteen Nineties era) upgrades of original Mirage 2000C single-seat fighters. While the 2000-5F is roughly on par with the old (but modestly upgraded) F-16 jets that Ukraine is receiving, it lacks the latter’s ground attack and AIM-120 air-to-air missile capabilities. That incompatibility, the smaller numbers available, and lack of ongoing production has—at the very least, until recently—muted Ukrainian interest in adopting Mirage 2000s.
British air power analyst Justin Bronk stated on social media that the “Mirage 2000-5, limited to MICA air-to-air [missile], lacks sufficient range to be effective against Russian fighters/strikers operating behind the very lethal Russian Surface-to-Air-Missile network. Hence, I don’t think it’s currently definitely worth the Ukrainian resources required to get it operational in there.”
Nonetheless, the Ukrainian Air Force’s have to make back losses—totaling roughly 75 combat aircraft after two years of high-intensity warfare—can have modified minds despite prior lukewarm enthusiasm. Mirage 2000s may also help shoot down Russian cruise missiles and drones assailing Ukrainian cities.
What number of Mirage 2000-5s are there to offer Ukraine?
Macron declined to specify a “definitive number” of Mirages with which France would furnish Ukraine. He also declined to list “names of the partner countries” involved, arguing that it might be more “effective” to keep up the secrecy of such details. Nonetheless, the “partner countries” bit strongly implies (without confirming) the involvement of a number of international partners in a Mirage 2000-5 transfer—two particularly likely candidates being Greece and Qatar.
France’s own aerospace force, l’Armée de l’Air et de l’Espace, originally procured 124 Mirage 2000C single-seat fighters. Within the Nineteen Nineties, they upgraded 37 to the improved Mirage-2000-5F model. Of those aircraft, records show that eight were lost in accidents between 1999 and 2022. Today, Flight Global’s World Air Forces 2024 counts 26 Mirage 2000-5Fs still in service, all under the Fighter Squadron 1/2 Cigognes (Stork) at Sauveur Air Base near Luxeuil. (The ‘missing’ 3 can have been cannibalized for spare parts.)
More capable Dassault Rafales will replace the Mirage 2000-5Fs by around 2029, as is usually recommended by a recent order of 40 more Rafales. So, it seems likely that Macron has decided to hurry up the retirement of at the very least some 2000-5Fs (one retired French officer speculates just 6 to 12) to enable transfer to Ukraine.
While export model Mirage 2000-5s support various precision ground attack weapons, France’s 2000-5Fs are only armed for air-to-air combat, for which they’re uniquely equipped with AIDA optical/infrared sensor pods adapted from the Rafale.
36 two-seat Mirage 2000Ds are as an alternative configured for strike missions—and people are slated to serve within the 2030s. One report suggests, nonetheless, that Dassault may have enough time to integrate support for SCALP cruise missiles onto donated Mirages by the point they’re transferred late in 2024.
France’s s single-seat Mirages have been busy, though. On March 9 of this yr, two Mirage 2000-5Fs scored the French air force’s first air-to-air kill since World War II—downing two Shahed-136 kamikaze drones launched by Houthi rebels in Yemen on the French air defense frigate Alsace. (Russia has also launched 1000’s of Shahed-136s at Ukraine.) 1/2 Squadron also maintains at the very least two Mirage 2000-5Fs on standby to guard Paris, and three in Djibouti to defend the French military base there.
To get more mileage from the “overhead” costs of Ukraine integrating a brand new aircraft type, France may seek to purchase back additional Mirage 2000s from export customers.
Notably, Indonesia abruptly canceled a $790 million purchase of Qatar’s 12 Mirage 2000-5EDA jets in February, which France could try to purchase back on Ukraine’s behalf. These jets reportedly integrated air-to-ground weapons, including 50 Black Pearl (a.k.a. Apache) runway cratering cruise missiles closely related to the SCALP cruise missiles France has already given Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Greece’s Hellenic Air Force operates 24 more advanced Mirage 2000-5 Mk2 fighters in its 331st Theseus Squadron at Tanagra Airbase. And its sister unit, 332nd Hawk squadron, recently exchanged its less-upgraded Mirage 2000EGMs and two-seat BGMs for Rafales—Greece has been exploring the possible sale of 18 of those older Mirages to India or Cypress. As Greece has also provided military aid to Ukraine, perhaps Mirages of either subtype could find their solution to Ukraine.
Other export customers include Egypt, India, Peru, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates. But these states could also be reluctant to anger Russia by authorizing a transfer (at the very least publicly), and/or face pressing security threats.
One other solution to construct on Ukraine’s Mirage acquisition is for France to eventually donate two-seat Mirage 2000D strike planes—though those are currently slated to proceed service into the 2030s.
Ukraine’s Beyond-Visual Range Challenge
The Mirage 2000 is extremely agile, with a formidable instantaneous turn rate, and excels at within-visual range (WVR) dogfighting.
But over the skies of Ukraine, WVR combat is rare, and beyond visual range (BVR) missiles, radars, and electronic self-defense prevail.
Though the Ukrainian Air Force (the PSU) has remarkably survived two years battling Russia’s much more advanced and various air arms, it’s Nineteen Eighties-era Su-27 Flanker and MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters currently have limited ability to inflict losses on Russia’s newer warplanes (Su-30SM and Su-35S Flanker fighters, Su-34 Fullback fighter-bombers, and modernized MiG-31BM Foxhound interceptors) on account of the inferior range of their missiles and radars.
That’s an issue, because Russia has increased use of standoff-range UMPK glide bombs released from beyond range of Ukraine’s ground-based air defenses (aside from the occasional surprise ambush) since 2023. Despite poor accuracy, their sheer numbers and explosive power are hitting Ukraine’s frontline troops hard. So, the PSU needs air-to-air capabilities that put Russian glide bombers in danger of their ‘protected zone.’
But in air-too-air combat, Russian fighter pilots lean on their technical benefits by engaging Ukrainian aircraft at maximum range with radar-guided fire-and-forget air-to-air missiles—notably, the R-77-1 and the rarer hypersonic R-37M (which, in theory, has a variety of as much as 250 miles). Such air-to-air missiles with built-in lively radar seekers are broadly codenamed ‘Fox 3’ by fighter pilots.
In contrast, Ukraine’s Soviet-vintage MiG-29 and Su-27 jets depend on R-27 semi-active radar-guided missiles for BVR combat, with a max range of 44-62 miles. These are ‘Fox 1’ missiles that require the launching aircraft to maintain its nose-mounted radar trained on the goal until the missile hits.
So, Russian pilots can launch an R-77-1 missiles from further away after which race off, knowing that their missile’s built-in seeker may proceed homing on course. Meanwhile, opposing Ukrainian pilots must choose from abandoning their attack to evade, or charging after Russian jets within the hopes of sustaining a radar lock despite the Fox 3 heading straight towards them. It’s not much of a alternative.
Ukraine thus needs its latest Western fighters to level the sphere in beyond-visual-range combat by introducing each more powerful radar and Fox-3-class missiles that at the very least match the R-77-1 in range. Those will even enable engaging Russian glide-bombing jets without venturing too far into Russia’s ground-based air defense zone.
The Mirage 2000-5 and its MICA missile partially addresses these challenges.
Can Mirages with MICA missiles defeat Russian air power?
The Mirage 2000-5F is primarily built to employ the medium-range MICA missile, which weighs 247 kilos and included a 26-pound fragmentation warhead. A Mirage can carry as much as six, and launch 4 concurrently at different targets using its RDY multi-beam radar.
MICAs can attain peak velocities of Mach 4, and use thrust-vectoring motors that may tilt their engine nozzles to execute tight turns comparable to 50 Gs. The Ukrainian Navy’s future flagship—the Turkish-built corvette Ivan Mazepa,—will even be armed with the surface-MICA-VL variant.
MICA missiles are priced at €1.5 million each, and are available in two air-launched variants: one with an lively KU-band radar (MICA-RF) and one other with an infrared homing seeker (MICA-IR). For long-range warfare (firing modes 1 or 2), these initially soar towards the expected position of the goal using inertial navigation, and possibly receive course updates via datalink from the launching fighter. Nonetheless, as they close range, they switch to their very own onboard seeker to finish the intercept. Thus, MICA-RF is a Fox 3 missile, while MICA-IR is an unusually long-range heat-seeker (Fox 2).
The MICA-IR may do double-duty as a short-range weapon (because of its minimum range of 500 meters), and may engage enemies via a helmet-mounted sight even when the Mirage’s nose is not pointing on the goal.
Nonetheless, MICA-RF’s maximum range of fifty miles still falls in need of the Russian R-77-1’s 68 miles. So, while MICA can do fire-and-forget shots, Russian fighters will still find a way to shoot first unless taken by surprise in a head-to-head.
Admittedly, the infrared-guided MICA-IR offers a novel option for stealthy attacks out to 37 miles, as IR-guided missiles don’t trigger a targeted aircraft’s Radar Warning Receiver. Though MICA-IR’s seeker is unlikely to accumulate its goal at maximum range, the missile is able to lock-on after launch.
A fighter’s on-board radar is as essential as its weapons in BVR combat, though each Russia and Ukraine extensively leverage ground-based radars for air combat as well.
The 2000-5F uses the RDY X-Band doppler radar with a mechanically rotating flat-panel antenna that scans a 60-degree arc. It reportedly has a max range of 70-80 miles, though a 1998 report describes a specialized very-long-range mode effective out to 92 miles.
Overall, this performance is best than the radars on Ukraine’s Soviet jets, and possibly even the APG-66(V)2A on Ukraine’s F-16s. Nonetheless, it falls in need of those on modern Russian fighters just like the Su-35S’s powerful Irbis-E radar, which has a reported range of 217-250-miles for detecting F-16-like aircraft with a focused scan.
Thus, Ukrainian F-16 or Mirage pilots would need to implement complex tactics leveraging electronic warfare, terrain masking, ground-based radars, and ground-based air defenses to temporarily/locally undermine Russia’s sensor-based benefits.
The Mirage 2000-5F does include a NATO standard Link 16 datalink, which should facilitate teaming up with F-16s, Western ground-based air defenses, and the GlobalEye airborne early warning radar plane Sweden plans to offer Ukraine.
Could Ukraine improve its Mirage 2000s?
Notably, manufacturer MBDA will begin delivering latest MICA-NG missiles with additional stored propellant made possible by miniaturization of electronics in 2026. That, combined with a brand new dual pulse motor, doubles MICA-NG’s range to 100 miles. It should are available in each lively AESA radar- and infrared-imaging seeker variants—each of which represent higher-resolution and countermeasure-resistant improvements over prior MICA seekers.
That means a serious leap in effectiveness, but not for 2 years. And even then, Ukraine might need to attend in line, given demand from France, Greece, and (possibly) India.
Moreover, fully leveraging MICA-NG’s 100-mile range would require an upgraded radar that may see further. Greece and the UAE’s Mirages use the newer RDY-2 radar with 15% greater range (allegedly as much as 87 miles for fighter-sized targets), synthetic aperture ground scanning, and tracking capabilities. So, that’s ‘droppable’ right into a Mirage-2000—but again, that’s not on the bottom model France owns.
Likewise, support for various precision air-to-surface weapons and pods developed for export Mirages might be retrofitted into 2000-5Fs given to Ukraine—but how quickly and cheaply is unclear.
India has modified its Mirage 2000s to make use of Soviet R-73 short-range air-to-air missiles and American Paveway laser-guided bombs (used successfully within the 1999 Kargil war against Pakistani bunkers). Ukraine has already extensively modified its Soviet jets to make use of Western weapons, and should modify Mirages it acquires too.
A fast guide to the Mirage 2000 and its many variants
The Mirage 2000 is the final word member of an illustrious family of delta-wing supersonic jet fighters by Dassault Aviation. The road began with the Mirage III, which first flew in 1956 and saw intense use in Cold War air battles.
The 2000 originated from a ‘Delta 1000’ project that began in 1972 as an inexpensive and more versatile complement to an ambitious twin-engine G8 with swing wings. The expensive G8 got axed in 1975, leaving the Mirage 2000 to enter French Air Force service in 1983. Factories at Argenteuil, Martignas and Bordeaux would ultimately construct 601 single- and two-seat Mirage 2000s, just over half (310) of which were for the French military and the rest of which were for export customers.
Roughly one-sixth (97 or 98) have been lost over 4 many years of operational service—all accidents, save for one Mirage 2000N, which was downed by a Serbian Igla man-portable missile.
The Mirage 2000 evolved similarly to the contemporary American F-16 fighter—each were short-range, air-refueling capable and versatile single-engine tactical fighters leveraging then-new, fly-by-wire controls to compensate for an aerodynamically unstable but highly maneuverable airframe. Each also combined low weight with a single powerful turbofan engine to attain high speeds or lug heavy payloads.
Specifically, the 8.25-ton Mirage 2000C could speed up as much as Mach 2.2 at high altitude, and carry nearly 7 tons of external stores. But unlike F-16s, France’s single-seat Mirage 2000Cs were delivered without support for precision-guided ground-attack weapons. Those were reserved for two-seat Mirage 2000D and 2000N strike variants. There have been also Mirage 2000B two-seat trainers.
The 2000C’s avionics included the Thomson RDI or RDM doppler radar (with ‘look-down, shoot-down’ capability) and a self-defense suite including a SABRE jamming system and SERVAL radar warning receiver. For weapons, there was the powerful built-in DEFA-554 30-millimeter twin revolver cannon, the Magic 550 short-range air-to-air missile, and the Super 530L medium-range missile.
Within the Nineteen Nineties, France modernized 37 of its Mirage 2000Cs to the 2000-5F model supporting larger external fuel tanks and then-new MICA missiles. Revamped avionics include a brand new glass cockpit, combined throttle/stick controls (HOTAS), improved self-defenses systems, more powerful computer processors, and far improved RDY radar. Qatar and Taiwan also procured this second-generation variant.
Finally, within the early 2000s, a third-generation Mirage 2000 variant called the 2000-5 Mk2—or 2000-9—hit the market boasting a contemporary navigation system, newer ICMS-3 integrated digital electronic warfare system (including latest geolocation and ELINT capabilities), and an uprated RDY-2 radar with a stealth mode and greatly improved range of ground scanning capability. Recent and refurbished 2000-5 Mk2s were sold to Greece, India (compatible with Israeli weapons), and the UAE, but none entered French service.
Operationally, Mirage 2000s flew combat air patrols in several armed conflicts that flared on the Iran-Pakistan and Peru-Ecuador borders, but the sort’s only aerial kill thus far got here in 1996 during an ordinarily non-lethal face-off between Turkish and Greek fighters. A Greek Mirage pilot unintentionally launched a Matra missile that downed a Turkish F-16D over the Aegean Sea.
Mirages have seen more combat use in the bottom attack role, particularly over the previous Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, the India-Pakistan border, the Middle East, and northwestern Africa (especially Chad, Libya, and Mali). French Mirage 2000s also famously flew to the rescue of a beleaguered U.S. special forces team in Niger in 2017.
Sébastien Roblin has written on the technical, historical, and political points of international security and conflict for publications including 19FortyFive, The National Interest, MSNBC, Forbes.com, Inside Unmanned Systems and War is Boring. He holds a Master’s degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China. You may follow his articles on Twitter.