Yang Wei, the chief designer of China’s J-20 stealth fighter, gave a chat in October discussing the U.S.’s B-21 Raider stealth bomber, which made its first flight in November after being unveiled to the general public a yr ago.
His audience was at China’s Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP)—also often called the 9th Institute—and the talk was a broad primer on the evolution of air warfare. It touched on the concept of jet fighter generations, the OODA decision-making loop, and so forth.
Commentators have claimed that Yang dunked on the B-21, saying that it “couldn’t compare to us”—supposedly comparing it to the yet-to-be publicly unveiled H-20 stealth bomber, in development by the Xi’an Aircraft Corporation andalso believed to be a nuclear-capable flying wing.
But here’s the remark’s full context: “When [the B-21] was advertised, it was said that it might be developed using digital engineering and its research and development speed can be fast. But actually, the primary flight has been delayed for 3 years, and I don’t think it will probably compare to us.”
Yang also put up slides with screenshots from old U.S. reports, noting how the B-21 would incorporate many already-developed components to reduces costs and R&D time to bolster his point.
He was, due to this fact, comparing the speed of China’s military R&D cycles and adoption of digital tools (a technology he’s promoted as a senior director in China’s military aerospace industry) to that of the U.S. And in that comparison, he concluded that China could still develop latest aircraft faster than the U.S. could.
This diss of the U.S. defense industry’s R&D and procurement processes isn’t precisely the “our plane is healthier than their plane” statement it’s been made out to be.
However the presentation’s actual bombshell got here innocuously. Yang congratulated CAEP for celebrating its 65th anniversary, and noted that his organization—the Chengdu Aircraft Research & Design Institute, which does R&D for the Chengdu Aerospace Corporation (CAC or CAIG)—is now working closely with CAEP on a typical project.
CAEP serves as China’s primary nuclear weapons research and development organization, and happens to be based near Chengdu in Mianyang.
Perhaps his words might be dismissed as a bureaucrat’s niceties about closer inter-departmental cooperation. Nevertheless it sure feels like Yang is implying that CAEP and CAC are, at a minimum, jointly studying and consulting on the technique of equipping Chengdu-built fighters with nuclear arms—a capability heretofore absent from China’s fighter fleet.
Why China hasn’t put nukes on fighters
Chinese nuclear doctrine has historically been focused on strategic weapons for defensive deterrence and retaliation—versus those primarily developed for ‘tactical’ use and warfighting advantages. That features a professed No-First Strike policy and a relatively small nuclear arsenal (albeit one which has been rapidly growing lately).
Thus, while the U.S. Air Force deploys tactical nuclear gravity bombs on its multi-role fighters, China’s air-based nuclear deterrence has been based on H-6 strategic bombers—apart from a small variety of specially modified Q-5 attack jets in play throughout the 1970-80s.
Even then, the PLA Air Force’s role in providing air-based nuclear deterrence is believed to have effectively lapsed for a period, before being resurrected around 2018. Currently, the 106th Bomber Brigade’s latest H-6N bombers—armed with air-launched ballistic missiles—are though to constitute China’s air-based nuclear deterrence and offer a regional standoff strike capability extending a couple of thousand miles. These bombers, distinguished by their protruding air-refueling probes, must depend on the reach of their missiles. The bombers themselves are too slow and simply detected to get near enemy air defenses and fighters.
Andreas Rupprecht, an authority who has published several books on Chinese military aviation, wrote to PopMech that nuclear weapons “are under the control of the Central Military Commission and a minimum of by what I do know, no PLA Army Air Force base has the vital infrastructure for nuclear weapons. Possibly at best, the 106th Bomber Brigade.”
Eventually, the H-20 should enter service and offer a longer-range penetrating strike capability. It should, theoretically, be stealthy enough to slide between air defenses and fly deeper into defended airspace, extending its reach considerably.
A nuclear-capable upgrade to China’s J-20 stealth fighter?
Perhaps the only rationale for a nuclear-armed J-20 is to provide the PLAAF a regional penetrating nuclear-strike capability while it waits for the H-20 to enter service.
Though H-6Ns are a viable means to a nuclear-delivery end, their standoff strikes may be detected while inbound, and are vulnerable to countermeasures. Having a secondary air-based nuclear platform with the range and stealth for penetrating strikes could confound defenses and increase the percentages of successfully striking, say, U.S. bases in Guam or other relevant areas within the Western Pacific.
The J-20 is essentially the most advanced fighter in PLAAF service. It’s also China’s only manned stealth jet, until the H-20 bomber and the lighter J-35 fighter enter service.
Though primarily an air superiority platform, the J-20 can also be ground-attack capable, and its potential as a nuclear strike plane has been remarked upon by some analysts because of its substantial weapons and fuel capability. After all, the J-20’s potential to elude detection and perform penetrating strikes can be the important thing point in its favor.
Admittedly, as a fighter at first, the J-20 was designed with an emphasis on frontal-aspect stealth. As a trade-off, it has weaker side and rear-aspect stealth capabilities—a liability when flying on deep strikes which might be potentially exposed to radars from those angles. But still, it’s probably more prone to successfully execute penetrating strikes than current non-stealth systems just like the JH-7 fighter-bomber.
Modifying any plane for nuclear weapons requires the installation of special wiring. But a nuke for the J-20 would likely require the event of a brand new small nuclear missile or bomb that may fit contained in the J-20’s internal weapons bay, as munitions carried underwing would increase its radar cross section.
Alternative possibilities: nuclear J-10 or JF-17?
CAC is involved within the production of two other military jets that might plausibly carry nuclear weapons: the JF-17 Thunder (for co-production with and use by Pakistan, and for export in small numbers to Nigeria and Myanmar) and the J-10 multi-role fighter. Each are short-range, non-stealth fighters unlikely to penetrate deeply into defended enemy airspace, and thus would primarily be useful for delivering strikes on targets near the frontline and border.
The U.S. does assign a tactical nuclear role to its F-16 jets, that are comparable to the J-10. But a more logical non-stealth candidate for that role can be China’s J-16 heavy fighter (built by the rival Shenyang Aircraft Corporation), which could carry a heavier nuclear payload over much greater distances than a J-10.
Again, though, ‘tactical’ nukes don’t fit with China’s known doctrine. But they do fit with Pakistan’s plans for the usage of tactical nuclear weapons in a serious ground war with India. And indeed, the JF-17 (which is co-produced in Pakistan) has been seen fitted with Ra’ad air-launched cruise missiles that might deliver nuclear attacks. It’s believed that the JF-17 has been anointed to tackle the nuclear-strike role currently held by Pakistan’s aging, French-built Mirages III and V jets.
Moreover, a recent model suggests that a new-generation Taimoor missile is being considered for fitting on the JF-17.
But while Pakistan is clearly exploring a nuclear role for the JF-17, the extent to which Chinese support is involved or vital is debatable. Nuclear capabilities are so sensitive, it’s likely Pakistan would must handle the nuclear-wiring of JF-17s by itself—something it likely can do, given quite a few other nuclear arms fielded by Islamabad.
A brand new aircraft with a nuclear role?
Yang’s remark could even have been referring to the studying of nuclear capability for a wholly latest and heretofore unknown bomber, drone, or sixth-generation fighter under development by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation.
Earlier in 2023, China’s AVIC conglomerate showed concept art of a tailless sixth-generation fighter that might succeed the J-20. Moreover, satellite photos revealed a curious tailless aircraft mockup (or demonstrator) at CAC’s institute 611 research facility.
A tailless design could improve all-aspect stealth, making such a plane right into a significantly better penetrating bomber.
A brand new strike platform wouldn’t must be manned—a drone might be developed faster and more inexpensively. The U.S.’s mysterious RQ-180 drone, as an illustration, is believed to be a flying wing with a possible nuclear role.
A drone is also controlled remotely via a two-seat fighter to perform the high-risk penetration a part of a nuclear strike mission. And indeed, China is reportedly upgrading its two-seat J-20S fighter for this capability, often called manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T). But again, a nuclear role for such drones can be a stretch beyond current practices.
All in all, it’s necessary to do not forget that Beijing hasn’t historically placed as much importance on tactical nuclear strikes as Russia or the U.S. After all, nonetheless, policies can change abruptly, as was observed with China’s surge in nuclear missile silo construction detected in 2021. The past doesn’t all the time reveal the long run.