Within the skies over Ukraine, one of the dramatic fighter duels in a long time is taking shape between an aging, but highly potent Western jet and one in all Russia’s most advanced fighters: the battle of the F-16 Fighting Falcon vs. the Sukhoi Su-35.
This might be greater than a clash of fighters. It should be a battle of philosophies between the Russian conception of fighters optimized for air combat, versus the Western conception of jets equally adept at air-to-air and air-to-ground combat.
It’s also a battle between old and recent. The F-16s that Ukraine will receive were designed within the Seventies, though heavily upgraded over time. Nonetheless, desperate to interchange its dwindling fleet of Soviet-era Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters, Ukraine might be glad to receive 45 or more pre-owned F-16s from Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, who’re replacing their Falcons with F-35 stealth fighters. With Ukrainian pilots currently being trained within the U.S. and other nations, the primary Ukrainian-piloted F-16s may fly this summer.
✈️ F-16 vs. Su-35: By the Numbers
The Su-35 made its combat debut during Russia’s 2016 intervention in Syria. However the war in Ukraine marks the Su-35’s real baptism of fireside against an opponent equipped with modern fighters and anti-aircraft missiles.
Comparing the F-16 to the Su-35 isn’t easy. The F-16 is a fourth-generation aircraft that entered service within the late Seventies alongside the F-15 Eagle and the Soviet Su-27 and MiG-29. The Su-35 is taken into account a part of generation 4.5, that are upgraded fourth-generation fighters that were introduced within the late Nineties, including the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, Typhoon, Rafale, and MiG-35.
“This just isn’t a knock on the F-16,” Brynn Tannehill, a defense expert and former U.S. Navy aviator, tells Popular Mechanics, “but it surely was designed back within the Seventies.”
Either way, the stakes couldn’t be higher. While American- and Russian-made fighters have been dueling for the reason that Korean War in 1950, the upcoming clash within the skies over Ukraine might be vital. Russian airpower has performed poorly despite numerical and technological superiority in Ukraine, yet recent airstrikes using glide bombs have devastated Ukrainian defenses. To stop the Russian bombardment and launch a successful counteroffensive, Ukraine might want to no less than contest control of the air, and ideally have the opportunity to launch airstrikes of its own.
// Viper and Flanker //
The F-16 Fighting Falcon (commonly generally known as the “Viper,” and infrequently because the “Lawn Dart”) was conceived out of embarrassment. Through the Vietnam War, the world’s strongest nation had didn’t overwhelm North Vietnam’s small air force. One reason was that the U.S. military was using aircraft resembling the F-4 Phantom—a strong, but heavy fighter originally designed to intercept Soviet bombers moderately than dogfight nimble MiGs.
This spurred a controversial group of innovators—the legendary “fighter mafia”—to persuade the U.S. Air Force that it needed a small, lightweight, and comparatively inexpensive fighter that might dogfight moderately than depend on long-range air-to-air missiles because the F-4 had. The result was one of the prolific modern jets, with greater than 4,600 built since 1976, utilized by 25 nations and growing. It has also seen more combat than most current fighters, especially by the U.S. and Israeli air forces.
The Viper is about 50 feet long with a wingspan of 33 feet and weighs about 10 tons. It could possibly reach a speed of Mach 2 (twice the speed of sound), is very maneuverable, and is armed with a 20-mm cannon in addition to 11 hardpoints to hold weapons and drop tanks, plus pods to jam radars and discover ground targets for precision-guided munitions. Its exact armament in Ukrainian hands will rely upon what munitions the U.S. and Europe conform to send, however the F-16 is equally formidable in air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Along with medium-range AIM-120 radar-homing and AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles, it might probably carry JDAM glide bombs, HARM anti-radiation missiles, and possibly long-range European missiles resembling Britain’s Storm Shadow. The AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, or AMRAAM, is especially necessary. Unlike Ukraine’s current radar-guided air-to-air missiles, which require the launch aircraft to repeatedly maintain radar lock on the goal, the AMRAAM has an onboard “fire and forget” radar that autonomously homes in on the goal.
But versatility in all things means less capability at anyone thing. “You should utilize the F-16 for air-to-air, but it surely’s not pretty much as good as an F-15,” Tannehill says. “You should utilize it for close-air support, but it surely’s not pretty much as good as an A-10. It could possibly do ground attack, but it surely’s not pretty much as good as an F-15E Strike Eagle. … It’s a great aircraft at virtually every little thing, but it surely’s not the very best at anything.”
The Su-35 also has an advanced history. It’s descended from the late-Seventies Su-27 (NATO code name: “Flanker”), an air superiority aircraft designed for air-to-air combat. It was intended to be the Soviet answer to the F-15: just the 2 twin-engine aircraft shows they’ve more in common than the F-15 has with the single-engine F-16.
The Su-35 was conceived within the early Nineteen Eighties as a more maneuverable version of the Su-27 Flanker (hence the Su-35 is generally known as the “Flanker-E” or “Super Flanker”). After Sukhoi experimented with various prototypes under the Soviet after which Russian governments, the present Su-35 took shape within the early 2000s as an improved Su-27 with some air-to-ground capability that makes it more like fighter-bombers resembling the F-16.
The Su-35 simply dwarfs the F-16. With a length of 72 feet and a wingspan of fifty feet, the Su-35 is about 50 percent larger than the F-16; at greater than 18 tons, it’s almost twice the load of the Viper. The Su-35 is armed with a 30-mm cannon in addition to a dozen hardpoints able to launching an array of air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance. What particularly worries Ukraine and the West are its long-range R-37 and R-77 radar-homing air-to-air missiles, that are fire-and-forget weapons that may pick off Ukrainian aircraft from beyond the range of Ukrainian air-to-air missiles.
Complicating matters is the range of aircraft involved. There are a lot of variants of the half-century-old F-16, including various “blocks” of U.S. Air Force Vipers, in addition to country-specific models for nations resembling Israel. The newest version is the F-16 Block 70, with an APG-83 Advanced Electronically Scanned Array radar, an upgraded engine, and conformal fuel tanks.
However the Danish and Dutch F-16s pledged to Ukraine are Cold War models. They’re F-16 MLU (Mid Life Update) models, that are European F-16A/Bs from the late Seventies that were upgraded within the mid-Nineties with features resembling an improved AN/APG-66(V)2 radar (an older non-AESA [Active Electronically Scanned Array] sensor), GPS navigation, and the potential to launch AIM-120 missiles. It is cheap to assume that they’re inferior to the most recent Vipers, but far superior to Cold War-era F-16s.
“With the Mid-Life Update, what you’ve got to remember is these aircraft have been continually upgraded with software that allow them to make use of modern weaponry,” Tannehill explains.
// The Su-35 Is More Maneuverable, But That Won’t Help //
Normally, a smaller vehicle is more maneuverable than an even bigger vehicle. But for jet fighters, it isn’t that easy. There are a selection of technical aspects, resembling wing-loading (advantage: F-16) and thrust-to-weight ratio for quick acceleration (advantage: Su-35).
What’s notable is that the Su-35 is taken into account “supermaneuverable,” largely since it uses thrust-vectoring, which employs steerable nozzles to direct engine thrust. Using a capability found on only just a few aircraft—including the F-22 and Su-30MKI—the Su-35 can perform the spectacular “Cobra maneuver,” where the fighter abruptly slows and stands on its tail, forcing an enemy aircraft behind to overshoot.
While impressive at air shows, the Cobra maneuver also deprives an aircraft of speed and energy, which just isn’t a great thing in a dogfight. But the actual problem is that while maneuverability was a problem in World War II or the Vietnam War, it just isn’t a significant factor in modern air combat. If today’s jets dogfight, it’s probably because one or each side either made a mistake or lacked the technical capability for stand-off attack. The trend is for contemporary fighters, resembling the F-35, to act as aerial snipers that stealthily pick off their prey with a long-range air-to-air missile that the goal doesn’t even detect until it’s too late.
“What really matters is your radar, your reach, your [network] connectivity and the way low-observable [stealthy] you might be,” Tannehill says. “Radar determines once you see the opposite guy. Reach lets you determine once you get to shoot. Low-observable lets you push in closer.”
Indeed, this has been the pattern within the Russo-Ukrainian War. Fearing advanced surface-to-air missiles resembling Russia’s S-400 and the U.S. Patriot, each Russian and Ukrainian aircraft have stayed on their respective sides of the front line, moderately than penetrating enemy airspace. Even when the Su-35 really is supermaneuverable—which has yet to be proven in actual combat—the Ukraine war has not provided a possibility to display it.
// The Su-35 Is the Higher Sniper //
Unfortunately for Ukraine, the Su-35 is deadly at beyond-visual-range air combat in addition to dogfighting. First, the Su-35 may spot the F-16 before the Viper spots the Flanker-E; the Su-35’s Irbis-E radar can reportedly detect airborne targets as much as 400 kilometers (249 miles) away, in response to its manufacturer, Tikhomirov.
The Irbis isn’t quite cutting-edge. It’s a passive electronically scanned array (PESA) system, which uses a single transmitter/receiver to emit a single beam on a single frequency through multiple antennas. This permits the radar beam to be electronically aimed toward different directions with no need to mechanically rotate the antennas. That’s not as advanced because the AESA radars used on many Western fighters—including the most recent F-16 Block 70 and Block 72 models—that use multiple transmitters to emit multiple signals at multiple frequencies concurrently.
AESA radars can track multiple targets and are less at risk of jamming. Nevertheless, Ukraine isn’t getting AESA-equipped F-16s. The F-16 MLU’s AN/APG-66(V)2 radar is a gimballed pulse-doppler system with mechanically steered antennas that provide slower scanning on one frequency at a time. “Pulse-doppler screams ‘80s vintage,” Tannehill says.
As well as, the Su-35’s radar is more powerful. It has 5 kilowatts of power in comparison with just 770 watts for the AN/APG-66(V)2, Tannehill says. “I’m not saying that it might probably see five times farther or ten times farther, but it might probably see rather a lot farther than an APG-66.”
As if superior radar isn’t enough, the Su-35 has—on paper—higher missiles. The R-37 has an estimated target-detection range of 400 kilometers (249 miles), while the R-77-1 has a spread of 110 kilometers (68 miles). These “fire and forget” active-homing missiles streak to the vicinity of their goal, after which use their very own onboard radar to home in for the kill.
How effective these missiles are at such extreme ranges is questionable, but against Ukraine’s older jets, the Su-35 has been lethal. Su-35s and Su-30SMs, flying safely behind Russian lines at 30,000 feet, are locking on to Ukrainian jets with their Irbis radar, after which firing R-37 and R-77-1 missiles. Ukrainian fighters are armed with Soviet-era R-27 missiles with a spread of around 50 miles. These early Nineteen Eighties weapons use semi-active radar which requires the launch aircraft to repeatedly illuminate the goal with a radar beam.
“Ukrainian pilots confirm that Russia’s Su-30SM and Su-35S completely outclass Ukrainian Air Force fighter aircraft on a technical level,” in response to a November 2022 report by Britain’s Royal United Services Institute think tank. “Throughout the war, Russian fighters have often been in a position to achieve a radar lock and launch R-77-1 missiles at Ukrainian fighters from over 100 kilometers [62 miles] away. Although such shots have a low probability of kill, they force Ukrainian pilots to go defensive or risk being hit while still far outside their very own effective range, and just a few such long-range shots found their mark.”
The U.S. has agreed to arm Ukraine’s F-16s with the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, first deployed in 1991. While the U.S. Air Force’s website lists the range of the AMRAAM as 20-plus miles, the most recent AIM-120D is estimated to have a spread of about 100 miles, which might outrange the R-77 but not the R-37. The Ukrainian government said in September 2023 that its AMRAAMs would have a spread of around 160 to 180 kilometers (99 to 112 miles), which points to the AIM-120D.
// Our Verdict //
The end result of a long-range missile duel between Flanker-E and Viper will rely upon quite a lot of aspects, including the standard of airborne jammers and decoys, how well these fighters are integrated into ground-based radars and missiles, and coordination between Su-35s and Russian A50 airborne radar aircraft.
And there are still other aspects that won’t grow to be evident until combat is joined. Equipped with the NATO-standard Link 16 datalink, the F-16 probably has superior networking capability to the Su-35. That may make it easier for Vipers to coordinate with other air and ground platforms, including receiving early warning and targeting data from other sensors. While advanced Russian aircraft even have datalinks, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been tormented by unreliable communications systems and rigid command and control.
Even when outranged and outnumbered, Ukrainian F-16s could fly low to avoid radar detection amid ground clutter, after which use sensor data from other platforms to launch an AIM-120 at Russian aircraft. “The Russians may discover the hard way just how good datalink plus AMRAAM is,” Tannehill says.
Or, perhaps Ukrainian F-16s will attempt to avoid air combat at any time when possible. As a substitute, they might be deemed more precious as air-to-ground platforms, launching HARM anti-radiation missiles against Russian air defense radars, and cruise missiles and glide bombs against bridges, supply depots, and command posts.
For Russia, the threat posed by the Su-35 will keep the F-16s in check. The duel between two of the world’s most capable fighters may end in stalemate.