Because the counteroffensive progresses, Ukraine’s leaders are giving higher priority to striking Russian targets beyond the immediate battlefield. They urge the West to offer modern fighter jets, just like the F-16, and longer-range rocket artillery, just like the ground-launched Army Tactical Missile System. Each weapons now seem likely to enter the fight this 12 months or next. How will they assist Ukraine?
Throughout the war, Russian forces have relied heavily on artillery, consistent with their doctrine of emphasizing cannon and rocket artillery to wear down an enemy. NATO, in contrast, leverages its air forces, which are often technically superior to Russia’s. Aircraft offer more flexibility and might attack multiple targets in a single sortie. Survivable air power can strike strategic and mobile targets deep behind enemy lines.
Until recently, the U.S. appeared hesitant to offer deep-strike arms. Allied initiative could have helped overcome this reticence. After Denmark and the Netherlands offered older F-16s, the Biden administration agreed to the transfer and offered help with pilot training. Allied provision of F-16s might be attractive to the U.S. because costs are shared.
Earlier, the White House looked as if it would fear that dispatching combat aircraft to Ukraine might cross a Russian red line, even perhaps prompting threats of a nuclear response. America rebuffed a Polish bid to send used MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine.
Other NATO allies even have decided that providing deep-strike weaponry is vital for Ukraine’s defense and price any risk of escalation. Recently, the British and French sent air-launched Storm Shadow and Scalp cruise missiles, respectively. A few of Ukraine’s fleet of aging Soviet-era fighters have been modified to hold them.
Ukrainian attacks on logistics depots behind the front lines have resulted in Russia losing hundreds of artillery shells together with fuel and other equipment. In devastating strikes on Crimea’s Sevastopol port, Storm Shadows, Scalps and seaborne drones could have seriously damaged a big Russian landing ship, diesel submarine and shore infrastructure.
As Ukraine transitions to European-provided F-16s, it can gain access to more advanced cruise missiles, resembling the low-observable Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. Additional forms of missiles may additionally help Ukraine hold in danger strategic Russian staging areas.
Russia’s air defense environment is one in all the world’s most difficult. It could possibly be dangerous for Ukrainian F-16s to fly deep into the battlefield and/or operate for long periods over Russian forces. Partly for that reason, ground-launched missiles are a vital complement to air power; they might be launched at any time and customarily have increased survivability relative to manned combat aircraft.
Fast-flying ballistic missiles are especially survivable as a consequence of their speed and maneuverability, though they’ve less range in comparison with cruise missiles. An extended-range ballistic missile able to precision attack, the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, might be fired from multiple launchers. Ukraine possesses several kinds, resembling the U.S.-made M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System and the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System.
The U.S. has been reluctant to offer ATACMS partly because stockpiles are limited while the Army awaits its alternative, the Precision Strike Missile. The Biden administration now hints that it might provide ATACMS. If it takes this step, nonetheless, Ukraine might receive only just a few dozen missiles.
The U.S. could facilitate delivery of more ATACMS by allowing the re-export of European-owned systems. Poland, Romania, Greece and Turkey have ATACMS. Last 12 months, Lithuania and Estonia signed purchase agreements.
Coordinated deep-strike capabilities — air-launched and ground-launched — will likely be best in degrading Russian forces and operations. Using air and ground launchers would force Russian commanders to devote substantial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to aim to search out these systems. The commanders would should divert these capabilities from other efforts.
In some cases, Ukraine might have to make hard selections. For the reason that U.S. could have a limited stockpile of deep-strike missiles just like the ATACMS and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Ukraine won’t receive as many deep-strike arms because it wants.
John Hoehn is an associate policy researcher on the think tank Rand and a former military analyst with the Congressional Research Service. Hunter Stoll is a policy analyst at Rand and an Army Reserve intelligence officer. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at Rand and was the U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the U.S.-USSR commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.