Ukrainian diplomats presented a shopping list of recent American arms that they were fascinated about acquiring at conference on December 6. In response to a report by Reuters, that the list included several recent, eyebrow-raising, big-ticket items—including Apache attack helicopters, the THAADS ballistic missile defense system, C-17 cargo jet, and F/A-18 Hornet jets, in addition to more familiar types of aid.
The brand new wish list comes at a trying time for Ukrainian president Zelensky, who recently confirmed that Ukraine’s counteroffensive this 12 months failed to realize its objectives. Moreover, bipartisan support for military aid to Ukraine, never unanimous, has broken under Republican House Majority leader Mike Johnson. Johnson has conditioned the following Ukraine aid package, price $61 billion (roughly 1% of the 2023 federal budget) on the passing of comprehensive immigration reform on Republican terms. Negotiations proceed, however it’s possible that no deal might be made before Congress adjourns for the 12 months.
If Congress finally ends up approving aid, Pentagon planners may have their work cut out for them in evaluating which items on the wish list are most practical, prone to survive inevitable Russian attacks, and don’t put overly sensitive technology in danger—after which determining how you can deliver on the approved items. Ideally, much could also be simply withdrawn from U.S. military stocks for free of charge. But some equipment may require recent production orders and/or significant refurbishing and modification before delivery.
In this text, we’ll consider old and recent items reportedly on the wish list, why Ukraine wants them, and the way likely they’re to turn out to be available.
More, please: Abrams and ATACMS
In October, the U.S. delivered to Ukraine a battalion of 31 refurbished M1A1 Abrams tanks—tanks that are more heavily armored and faster Russian and Ukrainian tanks, and now have superior sensors.
Unfortunately, one battalion can only go to this point in a war of a whole lot of battalions. It also seems that Europe might be unable to scale up transfers of comparable Leopard 2 tanks in 2024.
Wars will not be won in dribs and drabs. The U.S. has a whole lot of M1s in storage that it could refurbish for service in Ukraine, and produced 22 recent Abrams in 2023. With funding, the U.S. could work towards delivering multiple Abrams battalions annually.
The Biden administration hesitated to provide ATACMS ballistic missiles to Ukraine, before finally secretly transferring 20 of it oldest missiles this fall. These achieved spectacular leads to a strike on a Russian helicopter bases in October. Because the Pentagon just began receiving much improved PRsM missiles to interchange ATACMS, it arguably could justify releasing more to Ukraine.
MQ-9B SkyGuardian combat drones
SkyGuardian is a big, turboprop-powered combat drone (UCAV) that may fly as much as 40-hour missions at as much as 40,000 ft, surveilling the bottom below with a AN/APY-8 Lynx III radar. But like its forbearer, the MQ-9 Reaper, it also has teeth—nine hardpoints for payloads starting from anti-tank missiles and Paveway laser-guided bombs to communications intelligence and relay equipment and naval search radars.
The rationale: Ukraine has asked for MQ-9s since 2022, together with the Army’s MQ-1C Grey Eagle drones (deemed more likely), however the Biden administration demurred on advice from its DSCA regulatory agency. After early-war successes, Ukraine’s Turkish-built Bayraktar combat drones suffered heavy losses to Russian air defenses and mostly disappeared from public view. Larger and costlier American combat drones seemed liable to share the identical fate. Perhaps Ukraine’s Air Force believes that it will probably leverage longer-range missiles compatible with the MQ-9B for survivable standoff strikes, or intends to make use of MQ-9s in safer backfield intelligence, surveillance, and electronic warfare roles.
The likelihood: Perhaps. Manufacturer General Atomics has been desperate to supply Ukraine, and the Air Force is downsizing its MQ-9 fleet. Nonetheless, Ukraine may have to persuade U.S. officials of its concept for survivable, sustainable operations through which these expensive drones can be used.
Ukraine was reportedly fascinated about two other General Atomics drones. Likely, those were the smaller Gray Eagle, and maybe the jet-powered Avenger combat drone. The Avenger is quicker and stealthier, and thus might give you the option to penetrate defended airspace.
C-17 Globemaster III cargo jet and C-130J Super Hercules cargo plane
The Super Hercules is an in depth modernization of the venerable Lockheed C-130 family of turboprop-powered military transport planes, in service since 1956. The J model is distinguished by its digitized avionics, six-bladed scimitar propellers with ‘bendy’ suggestions, and downsized crew of three. It’s faster (cruising at 400 mph), and might fly 2,100 miles at a full payload of 21 tons.
The C-17 Globemaster III is maybe the world’s most sophisticated cargo jet. It’s designed to hold even heavy Abrams tanks and land on surprisingly short runways for an aircraft its size, with a max payload of 85.5 tons and a full load range hovering around 3,000 miles.
The rationale: Ukraine’s 4 surviving Il-76 strategic cargo jets have been busy bees ferrying military assistance to the realm. It’s comprehensible, and inevitable, that the Ukrainian Air Force introduce recent cargo planes not sourced from the country currently invading its borders. The C-130J can also be adaptable to many specialist roles (standoff surveillance, electronic warfare, aerial refueling, commando insertion, etc…). C-17s would enable the transportation of tanks and heavy artillery more rapidly from European repair centers and depots back into Ukraine.
The likelihood: Cargo planes are expensive. Nonetheless, the U.S. is seeking to downsize its fleet of older C-130H Hercules, which may very well be passed on to Ukraine. And factory-fresh C-130Js are purchasable at $75 million.
The C-17, nevertheless ended production in 2015 with no successor on the horizon. The Air Force is unlikely to provide them away.
F-16 Fighting Falcon and F/A-18 Hornet jet fighters
Ukraine’s long campaign for Western fighters scored its first victory within the spring of 2023 as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark agreed to collectively contribute planes and training to Ukraine’s future fleet of F-16A/B jet fighters. Ukraine wants F-16s from the U.S. too, and F/A-18 Hornets recently retired from U.S. Navy service.
The F-16 is a light-weight, single-engine jet fighter, while the Hornet is a twin-engine jet originally designed for carrier operations. Each are short-range multi-role (air-to-air, air-to-ground) aircraft noted for his or her maneuverability. The F-16 can attain higher maximum speed (Mach 2), however the Hornet has excellent lower speed, low-altitude performance, is healthier suited to short landing on austere runways, and has two additional weapons hardpoints. Hornets are costlier to operate.
The rationale: Currently, Ukraine’s Soviet fighters play a limited role within the conflict, as they’re outranged by the missiles and radars on newer Russian jets, and lack precision air-to-ground weapons. Ukraine argues that Western fighters—armed with long-range AIM-120 fire-and-forget missiles—could take the fight back to Russian airpower, in addition to perform strike and shut air support missions.
The likelihood: Perhaps. Biden has to this point shunned donating U.S.-built jets. Nonetheless, the Air Force is progressively downsizing its fleet of F-16C/D jets, which may very well be passed on. Ukraine could also order factory-fresh Block 70/72 F-16Vs, that are more equally matched with current Russian fighters due to their AESA-class radars.
Unlike the F-16, the F/A-18 is not any longer in production and faces global retirement in coming years. Nonetheless, Australia has 46 recently retired F/A-18A++ and B++ Hornets sitting in rather a lot, and the U.S. Navy retired many as well. Steadily retiring Hornets of the U.S. Marine Corps and air forces of Canada, Finland, Kuwait, and Spain could construct up a Ukrainian fleet over time.
UH-60 Blackhawk and AH-64 Apache helicopters
The AH-64 Apache is the U.S. Army’s heavy attack helicopter, noted for its armor protection, anti-tank armament (as much as 16 laser-guided Hellfire missiles), and talent to soundly detect and attack targets from behind cover using a mast-mounted Longbow sensor.
Blackhawks are the service’s standard medium transport helicopter—sleeker, twin-engine successors to the Hueys utilized in the Vietnam War. They will carry 11 soldiers or 4.5 tons of underslung cargo, and are adaptable to diverse missions (including by adding wing stubs to hold weapons).
Rationale: Ukraine’s fleet of Mi-8 ‘Hip’ multi-role helicopters and Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters have mostly survived by unleashing barrages of unguided rockets from long distance (to modest effect) and avoiding short-range air defenses.
Hellfire-armed Apaches could engage Russian vehicles from 6.7 miles away, potentially from behind obscuring cover and beyond the reach of most short-range defenses. That would enable more aggressive support of ground forces and the lively hunting of key enemy assets, quite than only being useful as fast-moving rocket artillery.
Blackhawks, meanwhile, would allow Ukraine to start transitioning to a fleet of Western-built transport helicopters with attendant performance and safety improvements, night-flying capability, and modern instruments.
Likelihood: Attack helicopters are each expensive and vulnerable, judging by Russia’s heavy attack helicopter losses over Ukraine. So, military planners may worry that the profit wouldn’t equal the fee. Still, Russian helicopters were effective in battling Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Boeing is currently churning out each recent and remanufactured AH-64E Apache Guardians, a few of which could theoretically be redirected to Ukraine.
Blackhawks are more cost effective. The Army might be downsizing its UH-60 fleet as recent Bell V-280 tilt-rotor aircraft (for its Future Vertical Lift program) take their places. A probable final Blackhawk production run began in 2022.
Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense system
High-arcing ballistic missiles are extremely difficult to intercept once they start plunging down towards their targets at again and again the speed of sound. But that’s what THAADS is designed to do, using interceptor missiles traveling at Mach 8 that may reach as much as 93 miles high into the mesosphere. A THAADS battery consists of six launcher trucks with eight interceptors each, two command centers, and an AN/TPY-2 radar.
Rationale: Ukrainian air defense have greater difficulty shooting down ballistic missiles, versus than cruise missiles. Along with its depleted arsenal of Iskander tactical ballistic missiles, Russia has taken to firing S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft missiles on a ballistic trajectory. Deploying THAADS batteries to major Ukrainian cities could protect them against such attacks.
Likelihood: On it’s face, poor. The Pentagon’s has only 7 THAADS batteries (with an 8th due in 2025) and so they’re in very high demand at global hotspots. Ukraine may give you the option to get in line to purchase future THAADs systems, nevertheless, as they seem cheaper than Patriot air defense units already sold to Ukraine.
Getting right down to the brass tacks of Ukrainian military aid
While the flashy items on Ukraine’s Christmas list draw attention, the truth stays that essentially the most vital military assistance Ukraine can receive is artillery and artillery ammunition—the ‘fuel’ which any military operations must burn to capture territory and defeat enemy attempts to do the identical.
That requires investing in factories to sustain high-volume production of 105- and, especially, 155-millimeter shells for several years—each to fight the war and to rebuild U.S., NATO, and Ukrainian stocks. The U.S. could also ramp up transfers of mortars and mortar ammunition of all calibers (60mm, 81mm, 120mm).
Other practical priority areas include armored vehicles, air defense, small- and medium-sized tactical drones, GPS-guided rockets, combat engineering equipment for laying and clearing mines, and electronic warfare systems that may disable drones, blind radars, and be sure that satellite-guided weapons land off track.
Artillery, drones, and mines account for vastly more vehicle and personnel losses than jets and helicopters, so related capabilities offer good bang-for-buck. Still, recent premium platforms can have strategic effects—so long as bread-and-butter needs aren’t neglected.
The above considerations will all be moot, nevertheless, if Congress fails to fund assistance to Ukraine resulting from partisan politics. Recent electoral outcomes in Slovakia and the Netherlands have also threatened military aid to Ukraine from those quarters.
The Russian commentariat is openly feting the responsible parties for what they imagine is the victory of the ‘wait the West out’ strategy. Realistically, Russia’s prospects for capturing much ground this winter still look poor, given atrocious losses and minimal gains in its repeated assaults on Avdiivka. But Russia might be encouraged to remain the course in Ukraine if it believes that Western aid to Ukraine is sputtering out.