When Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy returned from a visit to america in September, he had seemingly failed to accumulate the ATACMS ballistic missiles he had long requested for deep strikes on Russian forces in Ukraine yet again. But several White House insiders leaked rumors on the contrary.
Those rumors were dramatically verified at around 3 a.m. on October 17, when Ukraine HIMARS (or M270 launchers) fired a volley of M39 missiles—also generally known as MGM-140As—in an attack generally known as Operation Dragonfly. Ukraine’s military subsequently shared launch footage of three ATACMS missiles.
At velocities peaking above Mach 3, the missiles screamed over dozens of miles in only 2 to three minutes, before raining down on two Russian airbases in Luhansk and recently occupied Berdyansk. Each bases were crammed filled with Russian combat helicopters—dispatched for multiple every day sorties against Ukrainian ground forces 70 and 60 miles away, respectively.
The M39 missiles—produced from 1990 to 1997—are less accurate (no GPS guidance) and have shorter range (103 miles) than later models of ATACMS missiles, and all are technically expired. Above all, they depend on politically-sensitive cluster bomblets, which had grow to be shunned (though not legally banned) from U.S. military usage in favor of more precise weapons. But this summer, the Biden administration released stocks of DPICM cluster artillery rounds to Ukraine.
So, giving freely old, unlikely-to-be-used, expired M39s was finally deemed acceptable during Zelenskyy’s visit. Around 20 were secretly transferred to Ukraine, per the Recent York Times.
The M39’s very wide area of effect made it simpler against a selected type of goal: airbases with a lot of aircraft opened up across a tarmac. This very type of attack had been mock tested by the U.S., as you’ll be able to see within the video below:
Because the M39 missiles plunged toward their targets, they began spinning. Blow-off panels peeled off, releasing a halo-shaped spray of 950 small, incendiary M74 cluster bomblets—each weighing just over one pound.
The numerous 60-millimeter grenades released by each missile rained destruction on the airfields—blasting apart an ammunition depot, knocking out a Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense system, and causing a disaster for Russia’s precious helicopter fleet in what was likely the largest single-day loss to its air force since full-scale hostilities began in 2022 (and certain since World War II).
Ukraine’s military initially claimed the confirmed destruction of nine helicopters. A subsequent U.S. military assessment nonetheless, estimated 14 destroyed—nine at Berdyansk and five at Luhansk.
Using satellite imagery, open source analysts Geoconfirmed and Oryx counted 21 or 24 helicopters destroyed and damaged respectively. The latter catalogued several Ka-52s attack helicopters (eight destroyed and 7 damaged) a variety of Mi-8 assault transports (two destroyed and 7 damaged) hit in some capability.
Nonetheless, Oryx noted that most of the ‘merely’ damaged helicopters could also be effectively irreparable in ways not verifiable from satellite photos. Moreover, the damaged helicopters are likely in non-flyable condition, or they might have already got been flown out by the point satellite images were taken.
Dud M74 bomblets and the emptied-out hull of an M39 missile were recognized by Russian troops briefly order.
Prior to the strike, Russian military bloggers had warned that Ukraine was prone to obtain ATACMS soon, and that the forward bases utilized by Russian combat helicopters would prove exceptionally vulnerable.
But, as has repeatedly happened within the war in Ukraine, Russia’s military proved incapable of ducking the telegraphed punch until after taking a blow to the chin. Distinguished pro-Russian military aviation blog Fighter-Bomber called it “Some of the serious blows of all time within the Northern Military District. If not essentially the most serious [in the war so far.]” One other pro-Russian blogger, Rybar, claimed that six missiles were fired, three of which were intercepted by air defenses.
That is the second time that Russian helicopter bases relatively near the frontline have suffered mass casualties. In March of 2022, helicopters based in Chornobaivka were devastated by a Ukrainian artillery strike, with several Ka-52s, Mi-28s, and Mi-8/17s confirmed lost.
Supporters of Ukraine will lament, nonetheless, that the ATACMS strikes fell well after they might have been most useful—Ukraine’s counteroffensive has resulted in little movement since September. Russian attack helicopters particularly contributed to heavy Ukrainian armor losses within the counteroffensive’s first weeks, and as such, a helicopter-based strike in May or June would have had much greater immediate impact on the war.
How precious were the losses?
Combat helicopters are expensive—each costs thousands and thousands to tens of thousands and thousands of dollars.
The Mi-8 ‘Hip’ is the longtime workhorse multi-role transport helicopter of Russia’s forces, designed to hold heavier passenger loads than U.S. medium-lift helicopters. Now not much utilized in their assault transport role in Ukraine as a result of the prevalence of effective short-range air defenses, they now serve various rear-area utility roles, perform maritime patrols, and launch unguided rocket barrages from standoff-range.
While some specialized or modern Mi-8 variants are particularly precious, Russia has a deep inventory of Mi-8s that are in ongoing production. The most recent Mi-8s have been valued at $15-17 million on the export market, but likely cost less for domestic orders.
Russia had lost roughly 20 regular Mi-8s and 4 specialized Mi-8MTPR electronic warfare variants within the war prior to the ATACMS strike. Moreover, a contemporary Mi-8AMTSh was lost to a rigorously orchestrated defection.
Against this, the Ka-52 Alligator (NATO codename ‘Hokum’) is essentially the most advanced helicopter in use by either side within the war in Ukraine, alongside the rarer Mi-28 ‘Havoc’. The 2-seat attack helicopter is distinguished by its double-rotor configuration, which enables unusually great maneuverability and high speeds. Along with its fixed 30-millimeter cannon and rocket pods, the Alligator can engage targets from 3 to six miles away using each Vikhr anti-tank missiles and LMUR missiles while remaining outside the range of short-range air defenses.
Ukrainian sources told analysts that the Alligator’s L370P Vitebsk self-defense systems (also used on some Mi-8s) were highly effective at decoying man-portable heat-seeking missiles—typically, Soviet-built Iglas and U.S.-built Stingers. The Vitbesk suite is comprised of ultraviolet and laser warning receivers, two directional infrared/ultraviolet ‘jammer’ turrets (DIRCMs), and auto-discharged flare and chaff decoy dispensers.
Still, Ukrainian reports claim that the defenses occasionally did not activate for unclear reasons. In the long run, Ka-52s ended up taking very heavy losses: 40 were destroyed prior to this October’s ATACMS strike.
There’s little question that every loss stings, because the Ka-52 fleet was comprised of only around 130 airframes on the onset of large-scale hostilities and has shrunk considerably from its pre-war level. With roughly 59 Ka-52s now confirmed damaged or destroyed, roughly 44% of the Alligator fleet Russia began the larger-scale war with has been damaged or destroyed. And—if we’re going by the Oryx count—the ATACMS strikes destroyed or damaged 11.5% of Russia’s pre-war Alligator fleet in only at some point.
The adapting and regenerating threat of Russian attack helicopters
Unfortunately for Ukraine, while Russia is bad at anticipating recent threats, the country has proven adept at adapting its logistics and deployment to mitigate subsequent losses. On this case, which means Russia is now basing its helicopters further back from the frontline to scale back exposure to ATACMS strikes.
This, admittedly, will reduce the output and effectiveness of helicopter sorties—they’ll take longer transiting to the frontline, can have to hold lighter payloads, will devour more fuel, and can have less time over goal. Perhaps forward bases closer to the frontline will allow a small variety of helicopters at a time to briefly refuel and rearm on their strategy to the battlespace (thus reducing the time and numbers exposed to attack), but such methods still throttle sortie generation and soften the negative impact on Ukrainian ground operations.
The issue for Ukraine’s forces is that recent Ka-52Ms—valued at $15 million in 2021—are in production. Russia likely received 15 Ka-52Ms per yr in 2022 and 2023. Moreover, Russia’s defense ministry claims that the Alligator production rate has doubled or tripled, implying that between 30 and 45 Ka-52Ms will probably be able to go per yr moving forward.
The Ka-52M boasts extended-range GOES-451M electro-optical targeting turrets, recent longer-range ground-scanning radar (V006 Rezets or FH02), modernized L418 Monobloc self-defense systems (including recent radar warning receivers and jammers), structural reinforcements, and improved support for LMURS missiles and night-vision goggles. Overall, it appears in a position to more consistently engage targets at longer range, and more prone to evade incoming missiles.
Thus, a tactical and technological race is afoot. Russia will base its regenerating Ka-52 fleet farther from the frontline and have them rely more heavily on long-distance anti-tank missiles to avoid tactical air defenses. Ukraine, in turn, will seek recent methods to strike Russia’s more distant helicopter bases and seek for mobile frontline air defenses that may threaten Ka-52s inside guided missile range.
As for Ukraine’s small arsenal of ATACMS, plainly not less than three of the roughly 20 M39s estimated to have been given to Ukraine were expended. Which means several strikes are prone to follow in the approaching months—all looking for to leverage the missile’s high speed, 100-mile range, and huge area of effect.
For instance, ATACMS have historically been used to destroy air defenses. And indeed, on October 25, Russian sources shared video of what was said to be the higher a part of a classy Russian S-400 air defense battery going up in smoke in Luhansk, as a result of a strike by two more M39 missiles. The separated hulls of those missiles were photographed nearby. Russia’s defense ministry claimed that air defenses “intercepted” the missiles, which could also be true in a really literal sense.
Ukraine seems prone to eventually receive additional ATACMS because the U.S. Army begins replacing its inventory with improved Precision Strike Missiles starting in 2024. Indeed, there are already indications that 186-mile range missiles—which can imply the later M39A1 and M57-series ATACMS missiles—will probably be transferred to Ukraine by January.