It’s no secret that the U.S. and Turkey don’t see eye-to-eye in relation to Kurdish-led separatist Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria. The U.S. sees them as vital allies within the fight to complete off ISIS, while Turkey claims that they’re terrorists with designs on Turkish territory.
But greater than the same old harsh words were exchanged at 11:30 AM local time on Thursday, October 5. A missile-armed Turkish Bayraktar TB2 combat drone began directly approaching a camp jointly occupied by SDF and U.S. special forces at Tal Baydar (or Tell Baydar) in northeastern Syria, positioned 23 miles south of the Turkish border.
Since 7:30 AM, Turkish drones had been raining laser-guided missiles down on Kurdish positions near Hasakah—some as close as 1 kilometer away to the U.S. base and falling inside a pre-designated Restricted Operating Zones protecting U.S. troops.
After greater than a dozen calls to Turkish officials went unanswered, the drone had closed inside a half kilometer of the bottom’s position. Finally, an American F-16 jet shot down the drone with a missile at 11:40 AM. Reports, nevertheless, claim that the TB2 crashed near Tall Tamr, roughly 13 miles southwest of the bottom.
Sarcastically, the incident occurred just hours after a U.S. general emphasized the “open communications” between U.S. forces within the region and the Turkish Air Operations Center. But there could also be a proof: the drone was reportedly operated by the Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT) service, not the Turkish Air Force, explaining the Turkish defense ministry’s denial that they’d lost a drone.
The day before, Turkey said that it had determined that two PKK members—who attacked the Interior Ministry constructing in Ankara last weekend—had entered from Syria. In retaliation, Turkey said that it could view SDF infrastructure and energy facilities in Syria as legitimate targets.
Turkish strikes on SDF-held oil facilities do indeed appear to have taken place the identical day. At the least eight were reportedly killed in attacks on a automobile and a military outpost near Amuda. A bunch called the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights counts 10 killed in 17 Turkish drone strikes targeting an oil facility, oil and petrol stations, and two electricity transfer stations.
The incident probably won’t improve Turkey’s poor relationship with the U.S., though its potential for escalation also seems limited. Turkish officials have let or not it’s known that the shoot-down won’t deter its further planned strikes on SDF targets.
The Pentagon now claims that the Turkish drone didn’t seem like intentionally targeting U.S. troops, but was downed since it had nonetheless entered a restricted zone through which U.S. troops were vulnerable to attack.
But broadly, the muted and largely non-accusatory statements from U.S. and Turkish officials on Thursday indicate that each prefer to play down the incident fairly than fire up rancor over it.
It’s possible that the TB2’s operators within the intelligence service were someway unaware that it was approaching the American base and weren’t receiving the warnings, as they’re in communication with the U.S. military less consistently than Turkey’s air force. De-confliction in combat zones is a difficult business even in relation to friendly fire, let alone coordinating with one other country’s military.
But it surely’s also possible that they were attempting to intimidate the U.S. forces in the realm, and maybe even trigger a withdrawal. In October of 2019, U.S. special forces in an outpost near Kobani were apparently deliberately bracketed by Turkish artillery. 155-millimeter shells landed 300 meters to either side of their location, which was known to Turkish troops.
Still, in 2023, it’s pretty much established that shooting down a drone is perceived as an act below the brink for war or lethal retaliation—though nobody goes to outright state that. In 2019, the Trump administration canceled a planned airstrike on Iranian air defenses on the last minute after they downed a big RQ-4N drone over international waters using a missile. Admittedly, nations mostly avoid direct kinetic attacks on drones not in their very own airspace—though destructive harassment tactics like Russia’s dangerous buzzing of MQ-9 reconnaissance drones over the Black Sea is seemingly not seen as above the pale.
Furthermore, there are sharp limits to how far Turkey and the U.S. can be willing to escalate this episode, especially in a region where the U.S. still stores tactical nuclear weapons.
Why Turkey and America disagree concerning the Kurds in Syria
Around 900 American troops are stationed in territory held by the SDF in Syria, who’re seen as key allies and do the hard, dirty work of hunting down and ending off dangerous ISIS extremists. The Pentagon reported, for instance, that in September, joint U.S.-SDF operations reportedly captured seven ISIS fighters and killed one in Syria.
But Turkey argues that the Syria-based SDF is not any different than the PKK Kurdish insurgents who’ve been waging a separatist insurgency in Turkey for a long time.
The present SDF-U.S. alliance arguably began in September of 2014, when U.S. air power got here to the rescue of Kurds besieged by ISIS within the bloody battle of Kobani, Syria. Nearby Turkish tanks and artillery kept away from intervening.
As a U.S.-led, anti-ISIS military coalition formed, the SDF—using a hammer and anvil strategy—became its key instrument in physically clearing and occupying ISIS-held territory in Syria. First, American warplanes and rocket artillery would pound ISIS-held areas with smart bombs and missiles. Then, SDF forces would advance on the bottom, get ambushed, and suffer casualties fighting surviving ISIS units until a handful of accompanying Western special forces operator could call in additional air or artillery strikes to complete off the newly revealed ISIS positions. This arrangement kept Western casualties minimal, but 11,000 Kurds died within the anti-ISIS struggle.
Nevertheless, in October of 2019—mere hours after the Trump administration obligingly announced it was withdrawing U.S. troops from some SDF-held regions—Turkey attacked and seized SDF-held settlements west of the Euphrates River. Turkey would love to attack the remaining SDF-held regions, but stays blocked by the smaller remaining U.S. presence.
The shoot-down can also be notable for involving Turkey’s internationally notorious Baykar TB2 Bayraktar combat drone (or UCAV) and its laser-guided MAM-C and MAM-L mini smart bombs. These have seen distinguished combat use over Libya, Syria, the Karabakh region and Ukraine. Also they are sophisticated enough that one likely cost more (potentially around $5 million) than the air-to-air weapon used to destroy it.
The sort’s destruction by an F-16 can also be intriguing. Most UCAVs are much slower than jet fighters, and aren’t really expected to survive hostile encounters with them. But they’ll still be tricky to focus on, as a consequence of smaller size and thermal signature.
Recently, U.S. F-16s have been upgraded with recent capabilities, including a high-resolution AN/APG-83 SABR radar and a laser-guided rocket targeting system that would improve the kind’s effectiveness against drones. There isn’t a confirmation, nevertheless, that such equipment was involved within the recent kill.