Trevor Mahlmann
In September 2009, Boeing announced that it could take part in NASA’s recent “business crew” program. The aerospace industry leader vowed to bring its long experience in supporting the space agency and leverage its human spaceflight experience to make this system successful.
“Boeing has so much to supply NASA on this recent field of economic crew transportation services,” Keith Reiley, then the Boeing program manager for the project, said on the time. “To point out our commitment, we’re willing to make a considerable investment in research and development.”
This was a consequential moment for the brand new program, which lacked widespread support from Congress. The business initiative had only been created since the Obama administration tucked $50 million into its American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 for a brand new program start.
Lately, each of the 2 top leaders of NASA in 2009—former Administrator Charlie Bolden and Deputy Administrator Lori Garver—have pointed to Boeing’s entry into the business crew program as essential to its long-term success.
“Boeing entering the business crew program meant that you just got so much more support from Congress because they have an inclination to have a really robust lobbying program,” Garver said last 12 months. “I used to be very pleased when the normal, big aerospace company Boeing bid. Because I believe that was a troublesome call. And I believe if they appear back on it, they would not do it again.”
Lack of investment
Thursday’s disquieting announcement from Boeing that it found two serious questions of safety with its Starliner spacecraft—insufficiently strong parachute straps and lots of of feet of flammable tape contained in the vehicle—inside weeks of its first crewed flight raises questions anew in regards to the viability of this system.
So far, Boeing has taken nearly $900 million in charges against its earnings for setbacks in Starliner’s development, and this latest delay, which is more likely to take a minimum of six months to resolve, if not for much longer, will undoubtedly push those charges higher. It’s difficult to see Boeing ever earning profits on Starliner after nearly 14 years of involvement in business crew.
Although Reiley said in 2009 the corporate was making a “substantial investment” in the event of Starliner, then generally known as CST-100, multiple sources told Ars that was not the case. As an alternative, Boeing for a very long time “nickel-and-dimed” the time engineers spent working on Starliner. This was partly attributable to congressional underfunding of the business crew program but in addition because Boeing didn’t wish to put skin in the sport.
This has been a poor decision looking back because, attributable to the fixed-price nature of its contract with NASA, Boeing is basically liable for cost overruns and losses attributable to ongoing delays. The corporate now essentially has three options, none of which is especially appealing.
