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Source: Citadel Defense
On the AUVSI NE UAS and AAM Summit, a panel of experts discussed the regulatory environment for counter UAS technology.
Led by the FAA’s Executive Director of the Office of UAS and Emerging Entrants Security, Abigail Smith, a panel of experts and stakeholders discussed the present regulatory landscape for counter UAS (CUAS) technology: and the way regulations should evolve from here.
Currently, federal law prohibits anyone except a number of authorized agencies, operating under strictly defined circumstances, from disabling an aircraft: including an unauthorized drone. Which means that jamming, catching, or otherwise bringing down a drone threat is just not legal for many law enforcement, state agencies, or private sector infrastructure corporations. A 2020 advisory on using counter UAS systems stated:
Congress has exclusively authorized the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and Homeland Security to interact in limited UAS detection and mitigation activities to counter UAS presenting a reputable threat to covered facilities or assets, notwithstanding certain otherwise potentially applicable federal criminal laws, including various laws regarding surveillance. As well as, the FAA has been expressly authorized to interact in limited testing activities notwithstanding certain federal criminal surveillance laws.
Because no other entities have been granted that authority, it will be significant that state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) and personal sector entities without such statutory authority (including SLTT law enforcement organizations, SLTT governments, and owners and operators of critical infrastructure, stadiums, outdoor entertainment venues, airports, and other key sites) understand that federal laws may prevent, limit, or penalize the sale, possession, or use of UAS detection and mitigation capabilities. Capabilities for detecting and mitigating UAS may implicate federal criminal laws regarding surveillance, accessing or damaging computers, and damage to an aircraft. Below, the advisory sets out individually how detection and mitigation capabilities may implicate these laws.
There is critical pressure to develop standards and regulations that can allow more stakeholders to effectively develop and deploy CUAS systems. Today’s panel discussed the problem from different perspectives.
Current Counter Drone Technology
Patricia Baskinger is a technology expert and CEO at AX Enterprize. Her business has partnered with NUAIR, the NY UAS test site, from its inception: Patricia works on the adjoining research lab on counter UAS and UTM development.
From Patricia’s perspective, CUAS and UTM are closely related. Systems have evolved to push Distant ID and UTM data on on cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft on to the counter UAS system, for higher response times. “We’ve come a good distance on detect and discover,” said Patricia. Still, said Patricia, “Distant ID is insufficient to unravel the issue.” Distant ID is broadcast a brief distance: to have workable information pushed into UTM or CUAS system, that distance must increase. Moreover, bad actors could potentially spoof or replicate the signal of one other aircraft, making it difficult for counter UAS systems to distinguish the true aircraft from the replication. These are problems that Patricia’s team is working with defense agencies to resolve.
Getting accurate and timely identification data on unauthorized drones is essential to developing effective mitigation strategies.
“For the mitigation side, I don’t know that we’re ever going to have the authority that we’d like,” said Patricia. “But when we do, time is of the essense. Mitigation will follow identification that may allow the operator to concentrate on the one unauthorized drone and ignore all the authorized aircraft.”
Societal Perspectives
CUAS technology is a problem that generates strong feelings, no matter your standpoint. To successfully regulate and integrate CUAS systems within the U.S., all parties – from the technologists and defense agencies to non-drone users locally – must reach some understanding on what CUAS does, and the way CUAS can be deployed.
Michelle Duquette is an internationally renowned aviation integrator, operational expert, and strategist leading the unmanned and space portfolios at The MITRE Corporation’s Center for Advanced Aviation System Development. Michelle serves on the CUAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee’s (ARC) group accountable for addressing societal perspectives.
The FAA made a deliberate decision to diversify the perspectives represented on the ARC, said Michelle. “We typically have a really aviation-related mindset,” said Michelle. “But on the ARC, now we have the MLB, the NFL, National League of Cities, the ACLU, a chemical plant representative, a representative from an amusement park.”
“I’m an enormous believer in ensuring everybody’s voice is heard, because everybody’s voice is different,” she said. “We want to make sure that that we recognize where [regulations may be] missing the mark.” Michelle points out that educating the general public is a critical piece of integrating CUAS systems, to be able to cope with societal fears each real and imagined. “We are able to’t just give it lip service; now we have to discuss operationally about what we’re using CUAS for, to assist put people relaxed. We are able to’t forget the remainder of the world.”
Abby Smith agrees that this education is a big issue. “Everyone on this room is comfortable talking about technology issues,” said Abby. “The technical is basically the simple part. Bringing the community along, providing the education and allaying a few of the anxiety is basically the difficult part. ”
Beyond Federal Implementations: State and Local Governments
David Kovar is Founder and CEO URSA Inc., a UAV-related data analytics company. David works with states of Latest Hampshire and Delaware on developing counter UAS strategies. David says that while stakeholders have recognized the necessity for counter UAS solutions, they’ve been largely unable to deploy them. “We spent a few years complaining,” said David. “Now we’ve moved to ‘that is the state of play, let’s benefit from it.’”
The associated fee of CUAS systems could be prohibitive, a limiting factor for state and native governments. David says state-level stakeholders are creating counter drone proof of concept programs, in order that they could be able to put forth proposals to be considered for partnership with the FAA in testing CUAS systems at airports. Participating in testing programs will give states the chance to interact in the method and evaluate the technology. Moreover, states are taking a look at partnerships: “We want to seek out ways to make use of CUAS data for non-CUAS purposes, to leverage funding sources,” said David. “We need to share data and spread the associated fee of acquiring sensors and systems across entities.”
David says that the state representatives that he works with recognize the necessity for a counter UAS plan. “I won’t say we’d like fear… but we’d like motion,” said David. “Very, in a short time.”
Counter UAS for Infrastructure: Oil, Gas, Energy
Suzanne Lemieux is the Director of Operations Security and Emergency Response Policy on the American Petroleum Institute. In her industry, concern over the potential for an attack by drone is high. In 2022, Houthi rebels attacked a refinery in Abu Dhabi, striking 3 oil refueling vehicles and bringing home the chance of aerial incursions.
Oil refineries are uniquely sensitive environments. “If you’ve gotten anything that may spark, you’ve gotten an issue,” said Suzanne. “That’s partly why we’re nervous about drones.”
Suzanne says her industry sees challenges from a technical in addition to a regulatory perspective. “There are some technologies for detection which were oversold,” said Suzanne. Even when detection capabilities are capable of discover a drone incursion, regulations prohibit the corporate from disabling the intruder. “In private sector, now we have very limited options,” said Suzanne. “We’re going to get there sooner or later… but we’re really limited to what we will do today.”
Along with the physical threat of unauthorized drone incursions, Suzanne’s industry is increasingly concerned with cyber vulnerabilities in authorized drone operations. “Cybersecurity risk is real… it’s not if, it’s when,” said Suzanne. “That is something everyone must be fascinated about.”
Certainly one of the challenges of developing effective counter UAS systems and regulations is the speed at which drones have evolved and proliferated within the national airspace, and the advanced aircraft on the horizon. “I’ve seen a lot change since we began this in 2010… however the more we learn, the more we realize how much there may be to do,” commented Michelle Duquette. “We want to acknowledge that we’re in a totally different environment today.”
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