Summary
- The captain of the flight, who was the Pilot Flying (PF) didn’t appropriately reply to the lateral deviation of the Airbus A380.
- The PF didn’t reply to two go-around callouts by the primary officer, who was the Pilot Monitoring (PM).
- Singapore’s TSIB concluded that this was an unstable approach, warranting a go-around.
The Singaporean Transport Safety Investigation Board (TSIB), operating under the Ministry of Transport (MOT) of Singapore, detailed that an Emirates Airbus A380, registered as A6-EVJ, broke three runway edge lights when it drifted to the fitting of Runway 02L centerline after it had landed at Singapore Changi Airport (SIN) in March 2023.
Miscommunication about going around
The TSIB’s final report stated that on the time of the incident, the captain was the Pilot Flying (PF), while the primary officer was the Pilot Monitoring (PM), with the Airbus A380 flying with none abnormalities between Dubai International Airport (DXB) and SIN. Initial weather information indicated that weather conditions could be when the crew contacted Singapore Approach, the most recent data on Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) didn’t indicate any rain over SIN. As a precautionary measure, the crew prepared for each dry and wet runway landing on the airport.
Subsequently, the Air Traffic Control (ATC) transferred the flight from Singapore Approach to Changi Tower, with the flight crew using an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 02L. About 15 nautical miles (27.7 kilometers) south of SIN, the pilots observed some clouds over the airport, but after checking the weather radar, they concluded that the buildup was insignificant. Nevertheless, a runway controller told the TSIB that it was raining over SIN and that ATIS’ information was updated accordingly. TSIB continued.
Because the aircraft descended, the pilots saw the runway before going below 200 feet (60.96 meters) Above Ground Level (AGL) when the rain suddenly increased, surprising the PF. The pilot also told the investigators that this affected the handling of the aircraft, yet didn’t elaborate. In line with the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data, the PF disengaged the autopilot at 180 ft (54.8 m) AGL.
Photo: Emirates
Subsequently, each pilots noticed that the aircraft was drifting right off the runway centerline, with the primary officer calling out to remind the captain to align the aircraft with the runway. The PF applied sidestick inputs to counter the drift, with the captain telling the TSIB that the offset off the centerline was still inside safety limits. Nevertheless, at about 30 ft (9.1 m) AGL, the PM called for a go-around, with the captain responding, “No,Later, the captain said that he didn’t understand what the PM was saying, regardless that the primary officer once more told the captain to go around when the aircraft was touching down. The PF didn’t reply to the PM’s call out, telling the TSIB that he didn’t hear the second request from the PM.
Just before the aircraft touched down on Runway 02L, the PF applied a pointy left rudder input, and while this had resulted in a bank degree of lower than half a level to the left and the aircraft turning left toward the centerline, the
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Shortly after, the PF removed the rudder input, countering with a right rudder input, which resulted within the aircraft having a bank angle of about 4 degrees to the fitting. Once the aircraft touched down at SIN, it landed near the runway edge line, continuing to veer barely to the fitting, with the PF attempting to steer the Airbus A380 back towards the centerline, successfully doing so. The aircraft taxied back to the gate without further incident.
At the identical time, the watch manager at Changi Tower noticed that the white runway edge light icons had turned blue, indicating that potentially greater than 15% of the runway edge lights are unserviceable or that two adjoining lights are damaged. As well as, it could also mean that the electricity supply to the runway edge lights was faulty.
SIN’s Fault Management Center (FMC) informed the watch manager that three adjoining runway edge lights were damaged while the remaining were still operative. Moreover, the Airbus A380’s Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) warned the pilots about low tire pressure, with the bottom crew informing the pilots that one in all the right-hand (RH) primary landing gear (MLG) tires had a puncture when the aircraft was on the gate. Further inspection showed that one other RH MLG tire had
Photo: TSIB
Meanwhile, ATC sent out two runway inspection vehicles to examine the runway and the taxiways utilized by the A380 for any foreign object debris (FOD). For the reason that first vehicle didn’t find any FOD, controllers initially suspected that the low-pressure warning was unrelated to the three damaged runway edge lights. The second inspection vehicle found FOD, in addition to the three broken runway edge lights. The debris was found on the runway’s shoulder, grass, and Taxiway W7.
Misjudging the drift to the fitting
The TSIB identified that per Airbus guidelines, pilots needed to apply more roll input as an alternative of rudder input, which might have potentially fixed the lateral deviation. the investigators noted. Moreover, Emirates’ standard operating procedures (SOP) read that if a landing can’t be accomplished as briefed, a go-around is essential, with Airbus’ documentation stating that a go-around will be done so long as the thrust reversers haven’t been engaged.
Photo: TSIB
The TSIB said this approach might be categorized as unstable, meaning a go-around would have been prudent. Even when the PF expressed that the aircraft’s handling characteristics had modified, the Singaporean investigators couldn’t determine
As well as, while ATC doesn’t have to envision whether the pilots know the most recent ATIS information, the then-current ATIS said there was rain over SIN. Still, since this was not a big weather change, the controller determined that there was no substantial change in weather, which is why they didn’t inform the Emirates flight crew in regards to the rain. Nevertheless, the TSIB noted that this had not contributed to the incident since each pilots saw the rain and will have reacted accordingly, including initiating a go-around.
In conclusion, the TSIB stated that the PF didn’t manage to correct the drift to the fitting and didn’t consider a go-around, despite Emirates’ SOP saying that it’s mandatory to desert the approach when a go-around is known as out. Although the PF told the investigators he had not heard the PM’s call-out,
Photo: The Global Guy | Shutterstock
Following the incident, Emirates shared the data in regards to the occurrence with all its pilots on March 17, 2023, and commenced including the event as a part of its recurrent pilot training in August. Lastly, it reminded its pilots that after a go-around is known as out, it should be executed, and the PM ought to be able to take control of the aircraft.
As well as, the air traffic service provider at SIN conducted briefings to ATC, advising controllers to inform pilots in regards to the prevailing weather conditions, including rain over the airport. The TSIB only had two safety recommendations: that Emirates would remind its pilots in regards to the appropriate actions to repair a later deviation when landing and emphasize the importance of Crew Resource Management (CRM).
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