Within the misguided effort to advertise increased competition, the U.S. Senate Armed Service Committee has proposed changes to how the U.S. Space Force selects providers of national security launch services. Their attempted legislative override of the U.S. Space Force’s proposed contractor standards is reckless, and U.S. space leaders fear that it might compromise the success of the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) — the federal government program intended to guarantee access to space for the U.S. Department of Defense.
On June 22, the Senate Armed Services Committee advanced language throughout the 2024 National Defense Authorization Agreement that will open NSSL contracts for essentially the most stressing orbits to greater than two providers. The U.S. Space Force has warned that adding a further provider would increase costs and waste agency resources:
A 3rd provider would likely increase costs by greater than ~$5B. That $5B could possibly be used to purchase ~330 SDA satellites as an alternative. Likely only three bidders, so three awards won’t incentivize industry to bid best prices
It will not be as if the Air Force or the Space Force (which operates under the Department of the Air Force) is against promoting competition within the NSSL wherever feasible. Before SpaceX’s introduction of reusable launch vehicles into the marketplace, the Air Force launched the nation’s most sensitive military satellites exclusively on Boeing and Lockheed Martin expendable launch vehicles. Now, nevertheless, it has adapted to this modern breakthrough by awarding a lot of its contracts to SpaceX and United Launch Alliance, the Boeing-Lockheed Martin three way partnership whose yet-to-fly Vulcan Centaur rocket is designed for eventual reusability.
Furthermore, this yr — recognizing the potential of recent industry marketplace entrants during the last decade — the Space Force announced it could adopt a two-lane contracting approach for the NSSL. The primary lane would cater to smaller launches and will likely be open to any provider that has a proven flight record, while the second lane would cater to heavy-lift launches and will likely be open to simply two providers with proven flying abilities for high-risk missions. In testimony to Congress, the Air Force said that this approach thoughtfully balances reliability concerns with the necessity to promote, advance, and further the competitive marketplace and the longer term of American space travel.
Nonetheless, in accordance with its executive summary of the bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s recent NDAA language “establishes a further lane (Lane 2 A) two years into Phase III of the National Security Space Launch acquisition program to permit for greater competition throughout the field).” In other words, it could undercut the Space Force’s request for proposal by mandating that the department think about using greater than two providers for high-risk missions.
As stated, the U.S. Space Force has taken no issue with (and has actively fought to advertise) utilization of more contractors throughout the NSSL; that said, it has also made it clear that expanding the NSSL Program for to recent, unproven providers in the style that the committee is advocating would unnecessarily increase the potential for mission failure and added national security vulnerabilities.
As reported by , in May, America’s space procurement leaders explained this ad nauseam to members of Congress:
[Air Force Secretary Frank] Kendall said he supports the two-lane approach and revealed that the strategy was conceived by Frank Calvelli, assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration.
“I approved the acquisition strategy that Frank Calvelli got here up with,” Kendall told [Rep. Doug] Lamborn. “I believed it was really balanced. It allows us to bring recent entrants in early, fluidly, nevertheless it also gives us assured access for the upper risk missions.”
Plainly Congress is dismissing these concerns and pushing this procurement change to learn Blue Origin, which has spent years lobbying legislators for the prospect to do exactly what the NSSL requires.
There could also be some who wonder how Blue Origin might be awarded a contract when their launch vehicle, Latest Glenn, has not flown, but that doesn’t matter because an organization doesn’t need to have flown its vehicle by the point awardees are announced. All Blue Origin needs is a roadmap for certification. What does that roadmap involve? Well, fewer flights mean less data and insight, nevertheless it also means certification is quicker. For instance, the U.S. military may certify a launch vehicle — resembling the Vulcan — after two flights. Blue Origin? In accordance with Col. Douglas Pentecost, Launch Enterprise deputy director for the U.S. Air Force, it appears a three-flight certification process has been agreed upon. But does that mean Latest Glenn will likely be reliable? We don’t know. What we do know is that since its inception, the NSSL program has flown 97 missions with a 100% success rate, and that may be a success rate the military would really like to proceed.
Which raises the query: given the Air Force and Space Force’s impeccable track record with managing the NSSL program, why would Congress seek to override its preferences and concerns?
One other worry from space experts is when Latest Glenn will likely be ready for its first certification flight. Again, that is an unknown, since there have been multiple delays thus far. After missing its 2022 goal launch date, Blue Origin didn’t set a brand new goal; nevertheless, NASA is now planning to make use of the Latest Glenn in late 2024. So many delays might be easily construed as a scarcity of reliability lack of competitive performance, and these two metrics may result in delays which in turn may result in increased risks for U.S. national security.
It’s one thing to offer nascent firms like Blue Origin an on-ramp of sorts into the industry by giving them greater leeway over standard missions, because the Space Force has suggested. It is sort of one other to risk the safety of this nation’s high-risk missions.
Congress should take heed to the Space Force and reject the Senate Armed Services Committee’s change to the NSSL.