The Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS, continues to burn through the life span of its fighter aircraft in the war against Ukraine. After two years of air war, its total force is barely lower than 75% of its prewar strength.
The VKS has directly lost roughly 16 fighters over the past eight months. Nonetheless, this doesn’t account for the imputed losses, which arise from an aircraft accruing more flight hours than planned, reducing its overall life. Based on updated information, the VKS is heading in the right direction to suffer roughly 60 imputed aircraft losses this 12 months from overuse. That’s such as losing 26 recent airframes. Meanwhile the VKS currently procures only about 20 total Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft per 12 months.
The air war has mostly maintained a gradual state since mid-2023, excluding February 2024, when the VKS flew roughly 150 sorties per day in support of the Avdiivka offensive. Provided that Russia also has been using longer-range glide bombs and devoted more aircraft to air-to-ground roles, the typical sortie duration has also likely decreased, reducing the accelerated aging. Still, barely greater than half of the VKS’ tactical airframes are greater than 30 years old; these have far fewer flight hours left.
The accelerated aging could also be shaping Russia’s combat operations. Nearly all of VKS fighters operating (and lost) over Ukraine are the newer Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft with occasional reported sightings of Su-25s.
The older MiG-31s and Su-27s have been relegated to supporting hypersonic Kinzhal strikes and air patrol at a distance. With an estimated average remaining airframe lifetime of lower than 20% and 35% respectively, these older aircraft could be used for this war, but likely have insufficient life to support Russia’s potential future invasions.
Russia’s air-to-air warfare MiG-29s are totally absent, even from air-patrol missions. Given their age, these aircraft could also be either unserviceable or are being kept in reserve for a final mission. Regardless, whether because of lack of upgrades, survivability or age, these are effectively paper airplanes.
The Su-24s, then again, were used extensively within the invasion of Ukraine. But there have been no reports of Su-24 losses to date in 2024. How much are they still flying? These aircraft are old; the latest models were manufactured in 1993. The VKS can have chosen to not configure them for his or her recent FAB-1500 glide bombs, which might also hint on the incontrovertible fact that the Su-24s could also be reaching the tip of their useful lives.
Ukraine, which is short on air defense munitions, has a couple of options to speed up Russian air losses. Attacking air bases would likely reduce VKS sortie rates by greater than 20% by disrupting operations and forcing the VKS to fly from more distant bases. The best opportunity stays the effect of forthcoming F-16 jets (and possible Gripens) to divert VKS sorties from ground-attack to air-to-air efforts.
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Regardless, more air defense munitions and fighters can be critical to Ukrainian success. Russia is counting on only about 300 combined Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft for its operations over Ukraine, including delivering the hugely destructive glide bombs. From a strategic perspective, shooting down these newest VKS aircraft imposes a bigger cost to Russia and would have the best overall impact on the VKS’ ability to perform strikes. It might also improve the percentages of survival of the 45 F-16s allies promised to Ukraine.
The VKS has fewer than 650 tactical aircraft when accounting for end-of-life aircraft; it has even less when accounting for accelerated usage. But these numbers are unlikely to vary its behavior, based on Russia’s exhibited willingness to just accept high losses even for trivial gains.
Compared, NATO has roughly 800 fifth-generation aircraft, with one other 100 or more arriving yearly. That is greater than sufficient to counter the VKS within the air and conduct targeted ground strikes, especially given the poor performance of Russian surface-to-air missiles in Ukraine.
To make sure, NATO should expand its production of air-to-air and surface-to-air munitions to discourage further Russian aggression and support Ukraine. But with the VKS currently shrinking, the alliance can afford to donate more munitions to Ukraine now without worrying about its immediate strategic reserves.
Michael Bohnert is an engineer on the think tank Rand. He previously worked as an engineer for the U.S. Navy and the Naval Nuclear Laboratory.