The Biden administration promised 2023 can be “essentially the most transformative 12 months” for U.S. force posture within the Indo-Pacific region in a generation. With a trio of major political announcements and a proposed budget boost, 2023 is off to a robust start. But there isn’t any time for a scenic overlook of recent accomplishments. To attain the transformative effect needed to bolster deterrence against China, the Biden administration needs to maintain its foot on the gas.
In January, the US and Japan agreed to maintain the U.S. third Marine Division in Okinawa (as a substitute of Guam) and to interchange it with the brand new twelfth Marine Littoral Regiment in 2025. The 2 countries also agreed to share ammunition storage at Kadena Air Base.
In February, the US and the Philippines agreed to designate 4 recent sites as a part of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, which provides access for U.S. forces.
In March, the US agreed as a part of the AUKUS security partnership to increased U.S. submarine port visits to Australia and to rotate as much as 4 Virginia-class submarines by as early as 2027.
Also in March, the Pentagon’s budget request included $2.3 billion for military construction west of the international date line — a $400 million increase from the prior 12 months.
Thus far so good. But overcoming a decade-long “say-do” gap on Indo-Pacific posture and keeping pace with a rapidly evolving Chinese military threat would require sustained urgency matched by robust investment.
Constructing on recent political momentum is critical. With Japan, we’d like ambitious defense diplomacy to secure recent access for U.S. forces and to make shared use of bases, ports, airfields and other facilities the rule, not the exception. And after years of legal and political challenges, the U.S. and the Philippines must make up for lost time and maximize the potential of EDCA sites through accelerated investment and expanded combined training and operations.
More posture dollars must be focused directly on achieving a more distributed and resilient posture. Most investment within the Indo-Pacific is devoted to maintaining existing facilities or executing legacy posture initiatives, a few of questionable relevance to the present or future threat. That investment can be geographically concentrated. West of the international date line, the Pentagon plans to spend 75% of fiscal 2024 military construction funds in Japan and Guam — up from 66% the previous 12 months. Going forward, more investment is required within the second island chain, Oceania and Southeast Asia.
Beyond politics and budgets, achieving a “transformative” effect on Indo-Pacific posture requires actually moving forces. The Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” was matched with two additional destroyers and fifth-generation fighters in Japan; a further submarine and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery in Guam; and rotational littoral combat ships in Singapore, amongst other moves. The Biden administration must show similar follow-through, and there’s loads of options to accomplish that.
The Air Force has operated fifth-generation aircraft for nearly 20 years, nevertheless it has no plan to permanently station its most advanced fighters within the Indo-Pacific. The Air Force has promised to keep up a continuous fighter presence at Kadena Air Base in Japan, including fifth-generation aircraft, because it withdraws and retires F-15C/D aircraft. Beyond that, it has offered no specifics. Basing F-35As at Misawa Air Base in Japan can be a robust next step.
The Multi-Domain Task Force is central to the Army’s contribution toward joint operations within the Indo-Pacific. But while it has based MDTFs in Washington state and Hawaii, the Army doesn’t yet plan to station an MDTF west of the international date line. The Army chief of staff recently hinted this may increasingly change. The Biden administration should ensure it does, including by prioritizing access for an MDTF in defense diplomacy with Japan.
The Navy has long pledged to send its most advanced ships and aircraft to the Indo-Pacific. Nonetheless, of the Navy’s 20 commissioned Virginia-class submarines — critical to the U.S. military’s advantage over China — the Navy has sent 14 to Atlantic ports and just six to Pacific ports. And not one of the Navy’s most advanced attack boats are homeported west of the international date line. While keeping pace with Russia’s submarine threat is critical, the Biden administration should rebalance that laydown by stationing Virginia-class submarines in Guam and San Diego, California.
The Biden administration also needs to speed up investment within the logistics network that is crucial for credible deterrence and effective warfighting. Fuel storage and distribution is critical, especially with the planned closure of Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility. However the Pentagon is kicking the fuel can down the road. The Defense Logistics Agency plans to spend at the very least $360 million over the five-year Future Years Defense Program in projects for fuel facilities and storage west of the international date line. Nevertheless it has requested no funding for those projects in next two fiscal years, and punted most projects to FY27 and FY28. Working with Congress, the Biden administration should speed up these projects as able.
The weaknesses of U.S. force posture within the Indo-Pacific have contributed to the erosion of credible deterrence. But with sustained diplomatic urgency, robust investment and more advanced capabilities, a metamorphosis of U.S. force posture may help restore and preserve credible deterrence within the Indo-Pacific.
Dustin Walker is a nonresident fellow on the American Enterprise Institute think tank. He was previously an expert staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee and an adviser to Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz.