With F-16 fighter jets expected to be provided to Ukraine over the approaching months, opinions of their usefulness spans from a gamechanger within the war with Russia to a complete waste of resources. But there’s a technique that these aircraft will harm Russia even in the event that they never shoot down a missile, fighter jet or helicopter: They may cost the Russian Aerospace Forces precious aircraft life.
The Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS, possessed roughly 900 tactical aircraft before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. These included fighter, attack and fighter-bomber aircraft. For the reason that invasion, it has lost between 84 and 130 of those to air defenses, fighter aircraft and crashes. That’s only a portion of total losses, nevertheless. Overuse of those aircraft can also be costing Russia because the war drags on.
In a conflict’s early stages, what matters is total combat power from all energetic platforms; that represents the utmost firepower that could be directed on the opposition from the onset. In a protracted war, where one force tries to exhaust the opposite, it’s the entire longevity of the military force that matters. And that’s where the VKS finds itself now.
By my calculations, the additional hours that it’s pressed its aircraft into service since February 2022 have effectively cost it an extra 27 to 57 aircraft in imputed losses.
Aircraft have a life span. They’re designed with a complete variety of expected flight hours, that are used roughly evenly over the lifetime of the aircraft and segmented with periodic maintenance and inspection. For instance, if an aircraft is designed for 3,000 flight hours with an expected use of 30 years, the aircraft will fly roughly 100 hours per yr. If, during an inspection, wear on the plane is found to be roughly than expected, the projected remaining hours are adjusted accordingly. These numbers dictate all types of planning, from fuel procurement to ground maintenance to pilot training.
Imputed losses mean that the Russians have burned through more of the expected life span of their aircraft more quickly than anticipated. To make up for it, they’ll have to obtain more aircraft, increase maintenance, reduce operations, or accept a smaller force — or some combination of those.
The VKS continues to be within the means of transitioning from Soviet-era aircraft to more modern platforms, and an estimated 18 to 36 of those newer tactical aircraft join the force yearly. Almost half of the VKS force continues to be upgraded Soviet-era airframes.
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While newer Russian aircraft are designed for between 3,500 and 4,500 flight hours, with some as high as 6,000, those Soviet-era aircraft were designed to be within the air only 2,000 to three,500 hours. Although several platforms, similar to the MiG-31, have been upgraded to increase their service life, a lot of these older planes (Su-24, Su-25, Su-27, MiG-29) are nearing the tip of their service lives. These have, at best, 500 to 1,000 hours remaining.
In the primary few months of the war in Ukraine, the VKS was flying as many as 150 to 300 sorties per day — compared with the peacetime rate of roughly 60 per day. Even dropping to 100 sorties a day since, the VKS has principally flown double its normal annual hours for the reason that starting of the war.
This extra use is, by commonly used measures, similar to losing roughly 34 aircraft for the reason that start of the invasion. Nonetheless, this only captures the losses relative to the life span of newer airframes. Since the older airframes have so few remaining hours, it’s actually similar to losing about 57 VKS airframes.
To be clear, the precise composition of the VKS force and the precise age and historical usage of all its airframes aren’t precisely known. Further, some VKS tactical aircraft aren’t operating in Ukraine; they’re either harassing NATO aircraft or getting used for training. These sorties are along with previously mentioned Ukraine-related sorties and are in excess of the usage calculated above. They’re being conservatively excluded from the usage being applied to the entire force. These aspects likely mean that my estimate of 57 imputed losses is an undercount.
This ends in total true losses closer to 187 VKS airframes. Extrapolating this, the VKS will proceed to lose 30 to 60 airframes a yr from combat, accident and imputed losses.
There are some ways the Russians could mitigate such losses: Conduct more frequent and detailed inspections; increase maintenance; modify flight profiles and the way aircraft are rotated; and reduce the hours of coaching. All those might pare back imputed losses to more like 34 airframes. But these actions are expensive by way of manpower, time and resources — all of that are likely strained from ongoing conflict.
By the summer of 2024, combat losses and imputed flight hour losses may put the VKS below 75% of its prewar strength. To make up for that, the VKS might want to either increase production, reduce usage or reduce force structure for the subsequent 30 years. Overall, though, that’s not a horrible position to be in.
Nonetheless, the VKS soon will likely be facing a really different Ukrainian threat: F-16 fighter jets, more air defenses and cruise missiles.
Because the VKS devotes a greater share of its dwindling force to countering those, it should have fewer aircraft left to support Russian ground operations. VKS fighters within the sky can even be less capable, stemming from two years of overuse. This happens even when F-16s fail to attain a single air-to-air kill, and an upgraded Ukrainian fighter and air defense threat will rating many.
Michael Bohnert is a licensed engineer on the think tank Rand. He previously worked as an engineer at a naval nuclear laboratory.