Since September of 2022, Russia has launched nearly 4,000 Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 kamikaze drones at targets across Ukraine. These low cost, long-range weapons of (mostly) Iranian manufacture are estimated to cost merely $20,000 to $40,000 each. And Russia anticipates, perhaps ambitiously, that a brand new domestic factory will churn out 6,000 of the drones annually by 2025.
Fortunately, the piston-engine Shaheds (or Geran-2s per Russian designation) are very slow, with a cruising speed of 110 miles per hour. On some days, Ukrainian air defenses report shooting down every Shahed drone launched, mostly using anti-aircraft guns.
Nevertheless, on January 8, a Ukrainian military Telegram account posted images of a jet motor recovered from a wrecked Shahed in Ukraine that exposed Russia was now deploying—or no less than operationally testing—a jet-powered Shahed variant. That is believed to be an Iranian Shahed-238, a sort the country unveiled last Fall.
In early December of 2022, Russian general Vladimir Popov announced that a jet-powered kamikaze drone would soon be used over Ukraine, and further claimed it had a maximum speed of 500 miles per hour. (Another sources claim the speed is “above 500 kilometers per hour”, ie. 310 miles per hour).
The engine seemingly resembles the Iranian TEM Tolue-10 turbojet motor, which itself is illegally copied from a 39-pound Czech TJ100 engine that generates as much as 281 kilos of thrust and was developed to be used by each drones and DIY home-built aircraft. The Iranian knockoff has already been fitted to the country’s Ya’ali and Quds-1 cruise missiles.
By fitting a jet engine to a kamikaze drone, Iran has effectively refashioned it right into a cruise missile harking back to the V-1 ‘Buzz bombs’ that Hitler used to bombard London, Antwerp, and Brussels late in World War II.
Unfortunately, much greater speed makes the drone a tougher goal—it reduces the early warning time and engagement windows for Ukraine’s short-range air defenses considerably, and certain requires an increased use of costly missile-based defenses as a substitute of more cost-effective gun-based systems. However the jet-powered drones future impact will rely on how cost-efficient it’s to provide.
Assessing the Shahed-238
Development of a jet-powered Shahed spinoff was first revealed within the Iranian state media documentary Parchamdar (“Flagship”) in September of 2023, which featured footage of an apparent test strike.
Then, on November 19, three different Shahed-238 models were unveiled at a university aerospace exhibition of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Tehran.
Though the (likely standard) low-cost model uses satellite- and inertial-navigation for attacks on fixed targets, the 2 other variants are believed to incorporate an optical/infrared-guidance sensor for engaging onto moving targets and some-kind of radar seeker.
The precise nature of those variants is unclear. The EO/IR sensor might be to help handheld remote control by a human operator inside radio-control rage, or be designed to lock on mechanically to a heat source. Likewise, the radar-equipped model might be designed for autonomous targeting, or be a home-on-radar system that locks onto the emissions of air defense radars.
While the unique Shahed-136 was also offered with more flexible guidance methods, Russia has primarily used the most affordable fixed-target version for strategic attacks. After all, the improved penetration odds and latest nose-mounted sensors of the quicker Shahed-238 could see it utilized in alternative ways.
Footage from Parchamdar shows the Shahed-238 being launched from a moving truck—though, presumably, it may be catapult launched with rocket boosters from static launchers.
Interestingly, this earlier footage appears to indicate a fourth Shahed-238 variant equipped with an optical/infrared ball turret camera under its chin, which might make it way more effective for remote-control operations and reconnaissance missions.
How cost-efficient is the Shahed-238?
While the Shahed-238 poses unwelcome latest challenges for Ukraine’s air defenses, the important thing query is just how much they cost and the way easily Iran or Russia can churn out their miniature jet engines.
Jet engines are pricier than piston engines, and requires more robust heat-tolerant furnishings. For instance, as of early January, a Czech TJ100 engine is priced at nearly $70,000 dollars—by itself the value of two or three Shahed-136 drones. Its Iranian clone could also be cheaper, but only up to some extent.
Meaning the Shahed-238 assuredly costs way more than a Shahed-136, cutting into one in every of the originals’ primary benefits—it’s shear expendability.
The unit price is prone to be no less than $80,000-$100,000 per drone—though considerably higher is feasible as well—and much more for Shahed-238s variants with more capable sensors seekers.
The Shahed’s up-to-1,600-mile range would also likely be diminished, as turbojet propulsion is less fuel efficient. Admittedly, a reduced range would likely acceptable to Russia—while it could constrain options, Shaheds will be launched from many alternative areas near Ukrainian-controlled territory. It’s also possible the Shahed-238’s designer sought to compensate by either expanding fuel tanks, trimming weight away from other components just like the warhead, or swapping standard materials for costlier lightweight plastics.
Lastly, while substituting the Shahed-136’s propeller with a jet intake should reduce the Shahed-238’s radar cross section, its turbojet will considerably increase thermal signature.
Ultimately, to be advantageous, the Shahed-238s must either achieve the next penetration rate of Ukrainian defenses or absorb the next value of air defense missiles to make up for the proven fact that the identical money could have bought 4 or five (if not many more) Shahed-136s drones.
Unfortunately, it seems likely that Shahed-238s will still cost much lower than Russia’s Kh-101 and Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles. Those types cost one to 2 million-dollars each, as in addition they have much larger warheads and more sophisticated navigation systems.
For now, it’s unclear what number of Shahed-238s have been built, and the way quickly Iran and/or Russia can crank them out. While international sanctions haven’t stopped Iran and Russia from acquiring vital foreign-built components (particularly engines, navigation systems, and sensors), they do make obtaining those components costlier and the provision less reliable and consistent.
If the Shahed-238 is deemed effective, Russia may look to ascertain a domestic production line of an indigenous model, likely with some substituted domestic components. Nevertheless, doing so may take many months.
Ukraine, meanwhile, may have to evaluate whether it might probably cope with Shahed-238s without expending its most useful air defense weapons, just like the Patriot and S-300 missiles.
The questions surrounding Russia’s latest Iranian-devised killer drones, due to this fact, reflect that the war in Ukraine is without delay a war of high-speed technical and tactical innovation, and one in every of rival military-industrial production capacities unfolded across each the warring nations and their international allies.