Last 12 months, reports that fake signals were jeopardizing aircraft navigation systems spiked in the world over the Black Sea. First reported by security intelligence organization OpsGroup, the reports cited false or jammed global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals, affecting the U.S. global positioning system (GPS) civil signals, causing aircraft navigation systems to indicate missing or inaccurate position information.
More recently, an OpsGroup member reported experiencing GPS spoofing on January 29 after departing from Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport (LLBG). “This lasted until the FIR boundary. ATC was notified and provided vectors [to us] as an alternative.”
GNSS is an all-encompassing term referring to any satellite-based position, navigation, and timing (PNT) system that gives information to receivers comparable to portable GPS units and people installed in aircraft. The U.S. GPS is one such GNSS, and there are others comparable to Europe’s Galileo, Russia’s Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (Glonass), China’s BeiDou, and regional systems in Japan and India. Receivers could be made to operate on multiple GNSS constellations or only one. Most aircraft GNSS receivers use only the U.S. GPS constellation, while many portable GNSS receivers and watches with GNSS capability tap into multiple constellations.
GPS jamming overwhelms relatively weak GNSS signals, and within the U.S. and lots of other countries, it’s against the law to compromise GNSS. Spoofing just isn’t the identical as jamming and is more sophisticated, tricking the receiver into calculating a false position, which could send an aircraft off the specified course. Many modern avionics products depend on GNSS, and jamming and spoofing may cause problems beyond navigation, comparable to the autopilot switching off.
A pilot posted the next to the Phenom Pilots Forum (for pilots who fly Embraer Phenom 100 and 300 jets) on Dec. 3, 2022: On 12/1 I took off from OPLA [Lahore, Pakistan]. At roughly 1500 [feet] I encountered GPS jamming (or perhaps spoofing). The GPS failure caused AHRS failure and, most importantly, the HSI compass began spinning at a rapid rate and was unusable, and the autopilot…failed. The AHRS didn’t recuperate. Granted, we didn’t fly [less than] 200 knots and wings level for five minutes. We were more concerned about returning to the airport. Handheld GPS devices were also jammed in this example. We also received a right away TAWS warning, which needed to be silenced. I cannot stress how confusing and disconcerting this scenario was. Takeoff, GPS failure, TAWS collision alert, autopilot disconnect, spinning HSI compass, all concurrently.”
Growing Spoofing Reports
GPS spoofing continues to expand and increase, in line with OpsGroup, which earlier said it has received nearly 50 reports of pretend signals impacting aircraft operators. The group first sounded the alarm on the spoofing incidents last September, citing a dozen reports of aircraft being targeted with fake signals as they flew over Iraq near the Iranian border. In lots of cases, this led to an entire lack of navigational capability.
In late October, reports flowed in from operations over the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, and on approach to Amman, Jordan. In these cases, the aircraft showed a false position of being stationary over LLBG though they were so far as 212 nm away from the world. Newer incidents involved flights from LLBG which are being led towards Lebanon with spoofed signals.
Other reports cited by OpsGroup include a Gulfstream G650 that experienced full nav failure on departure from LLBG on October 25. The crew reported, “ATC advised we were off track and provided vectors. Inside a couple of minutes, our estimated position uncertain (EPU) was 99 nm, FMS, IRS, and GPS position were unreliable. The navigation system thought it was 225 nm south of our present position.” Similarly, a Bombardier Global Express was spoofed on departure from LLBG, receiving a false GPS position showing as overhead Beirut. OpsGroup noted that the crew said, “The controller warned us that we’re flying towards a forbidden area.” Meanwhile, a Boeing 777 within the Cairo FIR had encountered a 30-minute span of spoofing, with a false position showing the aircraft to be over LLBG.
On December 12, in line with OpsGroup, a member reported spoofing near OPLA while flying a Bombardier Global 6500. By running one FMS with GPS input switched on and one other with GPS off, the crew was in a position to observe a false GPS position showing the airplane 75 nm northeast of its actual position. ATC told the crew that they were actually on the correct track.
One other member reported GPS jamming while flying on Airway A599 within the VYYF/Yangon FIR over Myanmar.
What has the experts at OpsGroup concerned is that these problems are a “real-world discovery of a fundamental flaw in avionics design. If a GPS position signal is faked, most aircraft are incapable of detecting the ruse.” Lack of navigation occurs in some cases, while in others the fake signals have led to “subtle, undetected erroneous tracking. Within the worst cases, the impact has been severe—complete lack of onboard nav requiring ATC vectors, IRS [inertial reference system] failure, and unnoticed off-track navigation towards danger areas and hostile airspace. The industry has been slow to come back to terms with the problem, leaving flight crews alone to seek out ways of detecting and mitigating GPS spoofing.”
A very important tactic to attenuate the danger of spoofing, in line with OpsGroup, is awaiting a sudden increase within the EPU on cockpit displays (if available). Spoofing causes a “jump, hence EPU values have jumped from 0.1 nm to 60 nm, and greater than 99 nm in quick order.” Further, crews may receive an EFIS warning related to navigation, with some going straight to dead reckoning mode. One other clue is a major change within the aircraft clock’s UTC time—reports have ranged from a few hours to as much as 12-hour changes. OpsGroup advises that if this happens, crews should deselect GPS inputs as soon as possible to forestall wider navigation failure, switch to standard navaids, and report the problem to ATC.
On December 26, cargo airline UPS sent a “company notam” to pilots warning about jamming and spoofing in Azerbaijan airspace and over the Black Sea, Red Sea, and eastern Mediterranean. “UPS has been in touch with Boeing on this subject and it’s being actively monitored by Boeing, UPS, EASA, and the FAA.” The notam warned, “False EGPWS [enhanced ground proximity warning system] alerts may occur during or anytime after GPS spoofing on account of contamination of the GPS altitude within the EGPWS. Disabling GPS updating within the FMC won’t protect the EGPWS from spoofing.” UPS asked pilots to take photos of the indications and submit an event report. “Boeing will release an updated flight operations technical bulletin within the near future to deal with specific models,” the united statesnotam noted.
A Professor’s Research
“The principal fallback is an inertial sensor or the [IRS],” said Todd Humphreys, a PNT expert and professor on the University of Texas at Austin’s Cockrell School of Engineering. “When that gets captured, you realize that the design itself…appears to be flawed. In other words, the IRS just isn’t double-checking the GPS, it’s simply flywheeling through periods of GPS outage. If the GPS indicates it has a fix, then the IRS is accepting that fix without enough skepticism and updating its location and the rate and all of its internal coefficients based on that fix.
“Most business jets have something like three or two GPS receivers and frequently at the very least two IRSs. In other words, every one among those systems that is purportedly redundant [is] captured by the identical attack, so it doesn’t offer nearly the redundancy that those that designed it thought it will. When all of those are being affected by the identical source and have a typical mode failure, then it doesn’t have the extent of safety and security that that you simply may need expected.”
A number of years ago, Humphreys went to the difficulty of constructing a GPS spoofer while working on his Ph.D. at Cornell University. It took six months, he said, “and it was a reasonably large effort for me. Fast forward to 2023, and you may buy an off-the-shelf radio and download software that is on the market on GitHub. And also you’ve got yourself a spoofer.” Nonetheless, he doesn’t consider so-called hobbyists are behind the present attacks.
In his research, Humphreys partnered with a low-earth-orbit satellite network to pinpoint locations of spoofing attacks, using ADS-B outputs and anomalies of their navigation integrity category (NIC) flags. “We also have a look at the time history of locations reported,” he explained. “And from that point history, you may see a totally un-physical movement of the aircraft and know that the aircraft’s ADS-B unit was captured. You are on the lookout for anomalies within the trajectory. And from all of this, you may piece together what happened.”
With this information, Humphreys was in a position to pinpoint the origins of spoofing attacks, one among which was the eastern periphery of Tehran in Iran. “Since that point, very similar spoofing attacks with similar effects on business jets have develop into pretty widespread in the world of the Israel-Gaza conflict. This is likely to be a few of Palestine’s collaborators or it could just be the Israel Defense Forces attempting to protect Israel [from the enemy’s GPS-guided missiles].”
“I wish to say that spoofing is the brand new jamming, and what I mean by that’s that if you’ve an intent to disclaim GPS service to your adversaries, spoofing is a stronger technique of doing that than simply ham-fisted jamming. That is since you don’t require as much signal power to cause the receivers you are targeting to display either erroneous information or to display some flag that indicates a malfunction as in comparison with jamming. When jamming, you’ve to overwhelm the authentic signals. With spoofing, you simply must have signals which are of the identical magnitude because the authentic signals. They get wolfed up into the identical receiver. The receiver then gets confused and may’t tell the difference and sometimes will raise a flag and say, ‘Hey, I’m out, you may’t depend on me,’ they usually have then denied you service.”
Beyond mitigations that can lower the danger of spoofing attacks, that are being addressed by the industry, Humphreys believes a greater option could be to simplify the technique of certifying avionics, especially software-defined radios, that are much easier to upgrade quickly. “It’s tough to maintain ahead of the threats in the event you’re working on [technology] latencies of 20 years. That is the character of this business, unfortunately. But we wait until something bad happens before we do something about it.”
EASA/IATA Summit
EASA and the International Air Transport Association held a workshop in January to share incident information and remedies for GNSS jamming and spoofing. The workshop concluded that “interference with satellite-based services that provide information on the precise position of an aircraft can pose significant challenges to aviation safety.”
Workshop participants agreed on some measures to make PNT services provided by GNSS more resilient, including reporting events, eventually to a typical database; sharing aircraft manufacturers’ guidance to operators; sharing EASA alerts about attacks with relevant stakeholders; and ensuring a backup system with the minimum operational network of traditional ground-based navigation aids.
“[We] have seen a pointy rise in attacks on [GNSS] systems, which poses a security risk,” said EASA acting executive director Luc Tytgat. “EASA is tackling the danger specific to those recent technologies. We immediately have to be certain that pilots and crews can discover the risks and know the best way to react and land safely. Within the medium term, we are going to have to adapt the certification requirements of the navigation and landing systems. For the long term, we want to make sure we’re involved within the design of future satellite navigation systems. Countering this risk is a priority for the agency.”
EASA has also published Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R2 on this topic.
Avionics Updates
Avionics manufacturers are well aware of GNSS jamming and spoofing issues and are working on mitigation efforts, each with existing equipment and future products. In truth, there are recent standards that address these problems, including RTCA DO-384 and FAA TSO C220.
Northrop Grumman’s Litef division manufactures IRSs for quite a lot of aircraft manufacturers, and Klaus Blatter, product manager of business aviation, provided some background on how these systems work.
“The inertial system doesn’t receive GPS information but calculates position solely based on the measurement of the inertial sensors (in a classical installation),” he explained. “Since this position information just isn’t affected by GPS, it just isn’t liable to spoofing or jamming. Nonetheless, this pure inertial position information will not be accurate enough to take care of RNP/RNAV requirements in the long term. GPS correction is performed on the FMS. The FMS decides also if it uses the corrected or the uncorrected position information of the IRS.”
Modern IRSs calculate a blended or hybrid GPS/IRS solution, he added, which is provided to the FMS. “In case of GPS loss (i.e. jamming), the hybrid solution routinely continues providing position information based on the inertial measurements. The status of the hybrid solution (e.g. no GPS augmentation) can also be provided to the FMS. The time how long a certain RNP/RNAV operation could be maintained after GPS loss depends upon the specification of the inertial system. Often, inertial systems providing a hybrid solution are also providing a pure inertial solution in parallel.”
How the aircraft manufacturer integrates the avionics determines whether pilots can switch off the GPS input whether it is compromised. “On Litef’s inertial systems with hybrid solution, the GPS input could be switched off by commands,” he said. “However it is [up to] the system integrator if the command is implemented within the avionics.”
Pilots must be alerted to GNSS jamming, with an alert that GPS augmentation is lost, Blatter explained. “Spoofing is different: An inertial system with hybrid solution can perform plausibility checks of the received GPS data. These tests may detect inconsistent GPS signals and discard them. Nonetheless, this depends upon the sort and quality of spoofing. Even when suspicious data are initially detected, the spoofed GPS data could also be thought to be valid again after they give the impression of being consistent again. Because of this the extent of spoofing protection relies on how smart the plausibility checks could be done.”
The brand new RTCA DO-384 performance standard for IRSs will help with jamming and spoofing, he said.
Honeywell
Honeywell plans to certify an RTCA DO-384-compliant system this 12 months for a industrial airliner and next 12 months for its Laseref VI micro-inertial reference unit (IRU). Honeywell has also published a service information letter “describing the indications of spoofing and the expected avionics behaviors.” For more specific aircraft- and avionics-related procedures, Honeywell recommends consulting with the aircraft manufacturer. Nonetheless, Matt Picchetti, the corporate’s v-p and general manager of navigation and sensors, offered additional details about Honeywell’s IRUs.
“Current Honeywell ADIRUs and micro-IRU products output two various kinds of navigation parameters: a pure inertial set of navigation parameters and an inertial/GPS hybrid set of navigation parameters. The pure inertial set of navigation outputs will not be aided with GPS measurements and subsequently are unaffected by lack of GPS or GPS spoofing during flight. Along with pure inertial parameters, modern IRSs also output tightly integrated inertial/GPS hybrid navigation parameters.
“Current Honeywell ADIRU and micro-IRU products readily have some level of resilience to GPS spoofing for his or her inertial/GPS hybrid outputs. Honeywell has performed baseline testing of its inertial/GPS hybrid software against relevant industry standards. Results of that testing indicate that Honeywell’s state-of-the-art products can maintain integrity of the hybrid horizontal position output by rejecting a spoofed GPS position shift of 60 nm over a 60-minute exposure time. Nonetheless, in cases where spoofing-induced position steps persist for longer than can currently be detected and mitigated, IRS hybrid outputs will start utilizing spoofed GPS measurements.”
The newly updated IRUs, he said, “will further improve the resilience of the hybrid parameters to GPS spoofing with very low position shifts and prolonged durations. Honeywell’s recent patented algorithms can reject spoofed GPS position shifts of three nm for over 60 minutes, which constitutes a breakthrough improvement in comparison with today’s IRS behavior. The IRS may also have the option to illustrate to flight crews and aircraft systems when GPS spoofing occurs.
“Honeywell’s upcoming product updates within the 2024/2025 timeframe will allow [detection of] spoofing, alert crews, and keep providing a high integrity GNSS/IRS hybrid position solution bounded by horizontal protection limits throughout the duration of the spoofing event. Once these product updates can be found, Honeywell, subsequently, recommends that downstream systems comparable to the FMS or surveillance systems should use the hybrid GNSS/IRS from the IRS as their primary source of position, as it should be proof against GPS spoofing, while also being more accurate than pure inertial position. Attention must even be paid to the results on aircraft guidance during GPS-based approaches. Here again, the IRS will annunciate spoofing events to flight crews and aircraft systems such that GPS-dependent capabilities could be routinely or manually disabled.”
Universal Avionics
Universal FMSs with the most recent software can’t get compromised by GNSS jamming or spoofing due to the way in which the FMS uses position information from DME stations. This has long been a feature of Universal FMSs, explained Jason Mason, senior engineer, avionics systems integration. Within the Eighties, Universal engineers designed the FMS with navigation sensors which are run through Kalman filters to supply the best-computed position. After the U.S. Air Force switched off the GPS system’s selective availability in 2000 and GPS thus became more accurate for civil users, Universal weighted the Kalman filtering to GPS but demonstrated that DME scanning or triangulating based on DME position worked reliably when GPS signals were compromised. In 1991, Universal received FAA technical standard order approval for the DME scanning capability.
More recently, in response to customer concerns about jamming and spoofing, Universal issued a service letter to clarify this to users and it also made it clear to pilots what the FMS is doing. This was incorporated within the FMS 1002.6 software and later versions. A banner message, for instance, highlights that GNSS just isn’t working and that DME-DME is getting used, with the actual navigation position also displayed and recorded for post-flight perusal in Universal’s FlightReview app. This has also been added to FMS training software so pilots can see how the DME scanning protects against jamming and spoofing.
“Flight testing determined how well we will navigate with DME-DME,” said Mason. “After we realized we could do this, we decided to make it more apparent to the crew.”
The 1002.6 software is on the market in Universal W-series FMSs (since 2006), but there may be an STC available to upgrade from older units to the W-series as a drop-in substitute.
Collins Aerospace
Collins Aerospace makes a preferred GNSS receiver, the GLU 2100. Upgrades to the GLU 2100 will include making it field-upgradeable for easier modifications as requirements change. The corporate can also be working on designing GNSS receivers that may discover abnormal signals and compensate for them or notify the crew that the navigation source is invalid, in line with Adam Evanschwartz, who leads Collins Aerospace’s avionics business unit product strategy. Moreover, an easy mitigation for GNSS jamming is to construct receivers that may use multiple GNSS networks in case one is compromised.
Thales
Thales is aware of the specter of GNSS interference and has implemented a dedicated algorithm to detect the occurrence of spoofing. “If spoofing is detected, depending on the aircraft navigation system on board, aircraft guidance can routinely switch to sources that don’t use GPS for protected continued operations,” the corporate told AIN. “Together with the OEMs and global aviation industry, Thales is actively engaged within the initiatives to further reinforce operations protection from spoofing, by adapting technologies and algorithms already field-proven on military platforms.”
Safran
Safran is already manufacturing SkyNaute, an inertial navigation system (INS) that meets the brand new RTCA DO-384 standards using its compact hemispherical resonator gyro crystal technology. “Combining high performance and integrity in all circumstances, SkyNaute shows exceptional physical features in comparison with competing INS with similar performance,” in line with Alexandre Lenoble, senior v-p of navigation and timing product lines at Safran Electronics & Defense.
“There are two ways Safran INSs are in a position to detect and mitigate interferences: inertial sensors are by essence completely proof against GNSS jamming or spoofing. As a consequence, they could be used…to observe the correctness of the GNSS signals and the hybrid navigation solution. One other solution to do it’s to compute interference detection and mitigation algorithms directly on the signals provided by the GNSS receiver, before mixing those signals with the inertial part. This permits the INS, once it detects the spoofing event, to modify to a pure inertial/coasting navigation mode.
“As a PNT manufacturer, Safran is used to merging data from inertial sensors and GNSS with a purpose to compute an optimal hybrid navigation solution.”
Advanced Navigation
Advanced Navigation is taking a distinct approach to creating inertial navigation systems that may mitigate the risks of spoofing. “It is not any longer a possibility, but slightly, a certainty that critical industries, comparable to the aviation industry, will probably be disrupted by the proliferation of GNSS spoofing,” the corporate said upfront of the EASA/IATA summit. “Fortunately, leveraging the most recent technology to combat the most recent threat is an option. Due to this fact, it’s paramount that the private sector stays on the front foot to attenuate impact by assessing and rapidly deploying systems that may sustain with this growing concern.”
The corporate has developed an INS with what it says is “a brand new approach to filtering based on a proprietary artificial neural network processing.” The result’s “extremely precise navigation capabilities in GNSS-denied scenarios in addition to best-in-class integrity monitoring to detect and mitigate false or erroneous GNSS.”
On the whole, in line with Advanced Navigation, PNT-dependent industries should utilize multi-GNSS network receivers and advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring and incorporate newer INS with advanced integrity monitoring comparable to artificial neural network-based INS. They must also work with regulators to assist speed up the combination of recent technology. “Expediting certification processes, without compromising safety standards, can ensure aviation equipment stays on the forefront of defense against the ever-evolving threat landscape,” the corporate said.
Dassault Aviation
GNSS jamming and spoofing has develop into a “hot topic,” in line with Dassault pilot support engineer Mathias Paquier.
The best way Dassault has arrange the Honeywell avionics in its EASy-equipped business jets just isn’t to make use of the hybrid feature that uses GPS to update the IRS position.“This just isn’t the exact same on Falcon in comparison with competitors,” Paquier said. “This implies in practice that on Falcons when using the IRS inputs, this input can’t be impacted by GPS spoofing. As we don’t use [the hybrid inputs], the FMS can’t be impacted.”
The Falcons’ FMS picks the sensor with one of the best Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU), starting with GPS. If that’s compromised, the FMS then looks on the IRS position, then uses DME-DME or VOR-DME.
In fact, the latter require that the airplane be inside range of usable DME-DME or VOR-DME ground stations. But within the worst case and if the IRS would also fail, the FMS can proceed navigation based on dead reckoning.
Falcon pilots should know the symptoms of GPS jamming, which include lack of synthetic vision. “This might be the best one to identify,” he said. “It’s right in front of the pilots.” The subsequent symptom could be a CAS message for ADS-B Out fail, because ADS-B Out relies on GPS.
Secondary symptoms include a message comparable to “Unable RNP,” which indicates that the EPU is just too large for the required navigation performance (RNP) in the world where the airplane is flying. The EPU isn’t displayed on the PFD permanently but could be viewed on the “show sensors” page. The improved mode of the EGPWS may also not be available.
Finally, passengers will likely notice that the satcom now not works. “This can be a big inconvenience for passengers,” he noted. After the jamming ends, the aircraft will reconfigure and return to normal.
“After we speak about spoofing then things develop into tougher,” Paquier said.
When a customer experienced spoofing over Hatay Province in Turkey, the navigation system showed the airplane 70 nm away from its actual position. The UTC time on the pilot’s display was incorrect, which is a great spoofing indication, and the FMS popped up a message to “check IRS position.”
With no CAS message or obvious failure message, he explained, “It may well be really difficult for the pilots to understand what’s happening.”
Dassault has issued a bulletin to operators as early as April 2022 and advises when flying in areas liable to spoofing to deselect GPS 1 and a couple of on the nav sensors page. This deselects the GPS input from the FMS so the FMS isn’t using the GPS for navigation updates. “Even in the event you’re spoofed, this has no impact on the FMS,” he said. “After leaving the world, you may reselect the GPS input.”
In case pilots didn’t anticipate GPS deselection before being spoofing happens, they need to still deselect the GPS input, he said. “In case your FMS position has been corrupted and you then deselect, it should revert to the IRS mode. It is going to keep your last valid position (on this case the spoofed one) and will probably be updated using IRS input from there. The advice is subsequently to perform an update of the FMS position using raw IRS position. The raw IRS can’t be impacted by spoofing since it’s not impacted by GPS. The downside is that raw IRS position is impacted by IRS drift, but at the very least you’ll come back to an affordable position, which is then routinely updated using DME-DME or VOR-DME if inside range. In the event you’re taking off from a spoofing area, you may at all times deselect GPS and update the FMS after engine start using a reference point or lat/long position [on the ground].”
Paquier also advises pilots to know which IRS is essentially the most accurate, then select that one as the first. “You’ll be able to check the actual drift of every IRS on the avionics page. In the event you know IRS 2 is at all times less, our advice is that you simply might keep that one in mind when updating the FMS position.”
Some operators (not only in Falcons) have reported that the GPS doesn’t recuperate after a spoofing incident. Pilots must be prepared to navigate using non-GPS sources. “This poses an operational challenge,” he said, “in the event that they must fly long-range with no GPS. It requires more preparation. We used to fly like this 20 years ago, but we’re not comfortable flying today without GPS.”
While many countries are decommissioning ground-based navaids, many experts are recommending that countries maintain a sturdy network of ground-based navaids comparable to VOR and DME stations.
There may be one other unofficial technique that pilots might consider, and that’s pairing a conveyable multi-network GPS receiver to their tablet computers. Some receivers can use GPS, Galileo, and Glonass, and spoofing may only affect one among them. Obviously, regulators don’t permit pilots to make use of EFB moving maps as official navigation sources, however the EFB could provide a straightforward solution to confirm a spoofing encounter and in addition give some location advice to complement other sources. Using multiple constellations is definitely one among the possible medium-term improvements for aircraft GPS receivers. This isn’t a silver bullet, he identified, because jammers will likely jam all GNSS signals.
Paquier, who attended the EASA/IATA summit, concluded that immediate solutions will not be available. “Everybody is working hard on short-, medium-, and long-term mitigations. EASA is taking this really seriously. It’s essential to take into account that we’re discovering on daily basis each combination of avionics, sensors, and aircraft is producing barely different symptoms. And these can vary from one type to a different, even inside Dassault [platforms]. The data you’ll have from different OEMs is likely to be different. The story remains to be unfolding.”
Gulfstream
Gulfstream Aerospace has issued a maintenance operations letter to operators of its aircraft, first advising pilots to plan flights around known areas where jamming or spoofing is happening. “Whether it is essential to fly through such areas, consider utilizing ground-based navigation sources.”
Pilots should report any anomalies to ATC, the corporate advised. “When applicable, flight crews should request vectors and/or utilize ground-based navigation. Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) procedures must be followed for any Crew Alerting System (CAS) messages and indications of degraded navigation. Procedures must be followed for any CAS messages and indications of degraded navigation.”
Having assisted in producing the December Honeywell service information letter, Gulfstream can also be working with Collins Aerospace to supply similar information to operators flying its airplanes equipped with Collins avionics.
Bombardier
In line with Bombardier, the corporate “has been very proactive with its customers in regards to the realities of GPS spoofing.
“In late December 2023, Bombardier released an Advisory Wire to reinforce the communication to all our customers, adding to the FONs (Flight Operation Notifications) we published earlier that 12 months. As well as, we have now published several updates in our customer communications last 12 months to tell customers of the problem. We now have also worked closely with the(FAA and various fleet operators to make sure they’ve the most recent information.”
Satcom Direct
As an alternative of adding recent equipment, Satcom Direct offers geolocation technology for purchasers using its FlightDeck Freedom GeoServices. “Few situations are more alarming for flight crew than realizing they’re suddenly unable to accurately determine the aircraft position,” the corporate said. “When aircraft positioning can now not be accurately determined, separation within the sky becomes tougher to make sure and the danger of political complications greatly increases.”
GeoServices provides GeoNotification alerts when a customer’s aircraft is nearing a region where spoofing attacks have occurred, based on GeoFence settings in FlightDeck Freedom. “[This] provides users with a sophisticated warning of the danger, allowing them to change course and avoid the potential disruption to their navigation systems.”
AIN is aware of other efforts that can address GNSS jamming and spoofing and can report about these as they’re unveiled. One will probably be announced on the AEA avionics show March 19 and one other is a GPS anomaly detection app that has been released by flight planning app developer APG. Meanwhile, OpsGroup recommends that pilots view areas affected by GPS interference on the gpsjam.org website and “don’t fly into any red or yellow hexagons!”